Is Democracy Always for the Better? The Forgotten Plight of Afghanistan’s Hazara Minority

With the possibility of a democratic pandemic sweeping the Middle East and South Asia it is perhaps worth pausing to reflect on all the implications for a more populist form of government. Afghanistan has had at least the semblance of democracy for almost a decade – yet what is the fate of the minority in a country where, for generations, brutal oppression has been the modus-operandi of the majority?

Admittedly, not many lessons can be taken from the 2010 Afghan election result which saw widespread fraud, physical intimidation and murder of candidates, self-confessed war criminals on the ballot and only three million eligible voters expressing their preference at all in a country of over fifteen million people. Something that might just pique our interest, however, is that of the 249 seats up for grabs one quarter were won by Hazara candidates. This is indicative of two factors: firstly, Hazarajat is one of the safest areas of a country savaged by unrelenting sectarian violence; and secondly, the Hazara people have wholeheartedly embraced democracy and democratic values and fully appreciate the enormous opportunities that allied military intervention has provided.

The journey the Harazaras have taken to arrive at this point is a story of unremitting abuse. Their history follows the depressingly predictable trajectory of a predominantly Shia minority within a Sunni populace made up of Pashtuns, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Marked out by their faith and their mixed Eurasian genetic heritage, the Hazaras have found themselves on the wrong side of an apartheid society, a state of affairs interrupted only by intermittent genocides. The Eighteenth Century Emir, Dost Mohammed Kahn was content with targeted racial taxation, while his eventual successor, Abdur Rahman Khan, preferred to massacre or banish the hated Kafir (infidels). Following the attempt to conquer Afghanistan by the Soviets, the Hazaras were split into two warring factions, secular nationalists based in Pakistan and Khomeni-inspired Islamists who were ultimately successful. However, in subsuming the secular thinkers into their ranks the Iranian-supported Hazaras unified their various resistance factions under the nationalist umbrella of Hezb-eWhadat. The leader of this movement, Abdul Ali Mazari, was subsequently assassinated by a new and terrible Pashtun government made up of the very worst kind of Sunni extremists. The Taliban’s subsequent destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas which so appalled the international community was as much a display of power to the Hazara people sheltering in caves on that same hillside, as it was a statement of Islamic superiority or the removal of blasphemous idols. Whatever atrocities had been committed by the Emirs would pale in comparison to this regime’s truly exceptional brand of evil.


Besudi Hazara chieftains (taken by John Burke in 1879-80 - from wikisource)
Today Afghanistan falls under the purview of international law as overseen by the United Nations. Hazaras have grabbed the opportunity for education and democracy with both hands. Hazaras are to be found in almost every human rights and democracy-promoting organisation throughout the country. Even though they constitute only 9% of the populace over a third of all University entrance tests are taken by young Hazaras.[1] But this should hardly surprise Western observers. The Hazara people have long made education, even the education of women, a priority. Much of the money they raise within their own communities is spent setting up schools in Hazarajat, while arguments over the nature and necessity of pluralism have been raging in Central Afghanistan for generations while the rest of the country were content to allow the eradication of all ethnic, cultural and religious differences. Most tellingly of all, however, Hazara farmers almost unanimously eschew as “un-Islamic” the practice of Poppy growing that has been embraced wholeheartedly by swathes of the Pashtun population. In truth, the Hazaras were ready for liberation in a way the majority Sunni populations simply weren’t.

But of course, however many Hazaras end up in parliament, the Pashtuns and Tajic warlords still control Afghanistan. The pathetic Hamid Karzai may work alongside minorities in his administration but he has no interest in ending his people’s proud tradition of racist oppression. Of all the billions Afghanistan receive in aid money only a fraction of a fraction has been spent in the central regions – no new roads, new schools or new hospitals for the Hazara. Jobs in Kabul and other urban centres are still split along entirely racial lines, with Hazaras finding what manual work they can and still publically scorned by the less-educated majority. The universities are largely controlled by extremist Sunni pseudo-scholars who lack the intelligence of the Hazara students they either exclude or bully into leaving. Hazara youngsters who graduate at the top of their classes in mixed-raced schools suddenly find themselves denied entry to the lowliest universities, even as their less talented Pashtun and Tajic classmates mysteriously start excelling when they come to take entrance tests. While Pashtun-Tajic, Tajic-Uzbek or Uzbek-Pashtun marriages are generally permissible, no Hazara will ever be good enough for the son or daughter of a Sunni household. Finally, lest we forget, the Taliban are still an ugly and active force in Afghan regional politics. Hazara elders are routinely slaughtered by the fascist cowards who still claim divine right to rule the peoples of Afghanistan.

As long as the Afghan government has to bend to the popular will, supporting Hazaras will never be government policy. The only hope for these embattled people lies in the by-products of democracy: in particular, non-discriminatory education, a free press, and the abandonment of primitive fundamentalist religious values. Meanwhile, as we look over the middles east and see regimes on the brink of collapse, if not already toppled, for the first time we have to ask ourselves what the popular will has to say. Women, homosexuals, Christians, Jews, indeed all racial and religious minorities are faced with the possibility that majority opinion is about to make itself heard. I firmly believe, perhaps naively, that a new democracy inevitably transforms over time into a liberal democracy as the necessities of constant compromise and gradually improving educational standards help shape the popular mood. The process of getting there, however, may well be long, violent and scarred by flagrant inequality.


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[1] See Phil Zabriskie’s excellent article for National Geographic: The Outsiders

Source,

http://theharrysmallshow.wordpress.com/2011/02/26/is-democracy-always-for-the-better-the-forgotten-plight-of-afghanistan%e2%80%99s-hazara-minority/

Ten years after the destruction of Buddhist relics in Afghanistan

Only the outline of the one of the two Bamiyan Buddha statues is leftTen years ago the Taliban destroyed two huge, ancient Buddha statues in Afghanistan's Bamiyan region. That eliminated more than 1,000 years of cultural heritage, and much of the region's Hindu population has since left.
Exactly 10 years ago, on February 26, 2001, Taliban leader Mullah Omar ordered the destruction of two enormous and ancient Buddha statues in the Bamiyan region of Afghanistan. Monks who came to the region along with caravan routes connecting India and China had carved them into the face of a sandstone cliff some 1,500 years ago. Ratbil Shamel, of Deutsche Welle's Afghan service, answered questions about the situation there today.

Deutsche Welle: Can you tell me a bit about the Bamiyan area? How significant are its minority Hindu and Hazara populations? What role do they play in society there?

Ratbil Shamel: The Bamiyan region connected caravan routes between India and China, making it a significant region. It was a very interesting and important economic center, which is what brought these monks to the region. Also, Bamiyan has plenty of water and good soil for agriculture. So they carved these Buddha statues into the sandstone cliff along with very many living quarters. According to some sources they created as many as 900 living units.

Also, Mongol tribes settled in the region and were eventually converted to Islam. Those are the people we call the Hazara today. Over the years the region was intentionally left undeveloped to undermine them, and people still live in the cliff dwellings today. Since the fall of the Taliban, Bamiyan has experienced a kind of rebirth.

The Buddha statues themselves were never considered by the local population as religious icons. To them, they were just a part of history which had always been there. The people themselves never tried to destroy the statues.

What was the significance of Mullah Omar's edict that the statues should be destroyed?

For the Taliban, Mullah Omar is the "Emir" and therefore the leader of all believers in the world. They are anything but modest. And if the leader of all the world's believers delivers a religious edict, then all Muslims are obliged to obey. Of course, the people of Afghanistan didn't do so - the statues were part of their culture. Taliban fighters did it. They destroyed more than a thousand years of cultural heritage.

How much of an effect does this ideology have on the Afghani population?

Bildunterschrift: Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: Deutsche Welle's Ratbil ShamelEven today Mullah Omar's followers believe his word is final and above everything else. If he orders suicide bombings or the destruction of schools, then the population will suffer from that. It's a very large problem.

How much religious tolerance exists in Afghan society today as a whole?

First of all, people are generally not on the side of the Taliban. So far there have been no demonstrations in favor of the Taliban or al Qaeda, as there have been in Pakistan.

The fact that Hindus are actually the original inhabitants of the region who never gave up their religion - that is not accepted with tolerance amongst the population. Hindu children struggle in schools, their families have difficulties with the authorities and the government either won't or can't protect them. Tolerance towards Hindus has dwindled with 30 years of war, and many of them are leaving the country, as the Jews did.

People are leaving Afghanistan. So how close is the link between the country and its immigrant diaspora?

All of the refugees who have fled Afghanistan maintain a very close link with the country, because they are often the ones who are supplying their families with money. Without them, many families would be completely without means. There are hardly any Afghans in exile who have no link to Afghanistan. At the very least they are usually supporting family members or former neighbors.

What kind a societal impact does this have on Afghanistan?

It has enabled thousands of families to send their children to school. Also, relatives in exile send home books and try to chat with their family over the Internet. This in itself has a positive impact, because it means less people are willing to believe radical propaganda telling them that people in the West are immoral enemies of Islam wanting to destroy Afghanistan's pride.

How have the Afghan people's conceptions of what Islam is - and how it should be practiced - changed as a result?

The biggest change is that people recognize that the Taliban and al Qaeda have nothing to do with the reality of Islam. Islam is a peaceful religion, and we lived for hundreds of years in harmony with our neighbors - whether they were Hindus or others.

The average Afghan has a background of Sufism, which preaches to "live and let live." The radicalization and politicization of Islam began after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, when it was presented as an alternative to the "godless communists."

People now are less under the influence of Taliban propaganda - and they have less faith in the Taliban - because they've seen what that vision of Afghanistan's future looks like. That could change if the development of the country doesn't succeed at all. But they want peace, because it's something most of them have never experienced. The absolute majority of Afghans don't know what it means to live in peace; they only know that it's something they feel a deep yearning for.

Interview: Gerhard Schneibel
Editor: Nicole Goebel


Source,
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,14874410,00.html

Looking at ‘the other’ through very different lenses

R.M. Vaughan: The Exhibitionist

Rafal Gerszak at Pikto Gallery
Until March 6, 55 Mill St., Building 59-103, Toronto; pikto.com/gallery

Two very different photographic experiences await viewers with the fortitude to go stroller-dodging through Toronto’s Distillery District.

Rafal Gerszak’s Thousand, a photo-documentary of the Hazara community in Afghanistan – a minority group who live under near-constant threat of violence from the dominant populations – is a remarkably gentle show, given the ungentle reality of the Hazara people. Taken with an old camera (i.e. using rolls of film, not digital files) that Gerszak bought in Afghanistan, the portraits and landscapes are suffused with a smoky, indistinct light, a dreamy texture that makes this largely unknown people seem even more difficult to know.
I know it’s cliché to talk about the warmth of film compared with digital imagery’s crisp exactness (not to mention the whole mysterious peoples in faraway lands chestnut), but sometimes the film/digital cliché is just true (and people you don’t know are mysterious, whether they live on another continent or next door). But Gerszak is careful not to fall into the exoticizing traps of Orientalism – while the photos may look as if they were taken through a cloud of incense haze, the subjects are too self-aware, and camera-aware, to be read as romanticized others, as uninformed objects of questionable anthropological study.

In one image, a woman stands in front of a plaster wall that looks like it was the victim of a bad mould attack, or worse. Small and finely featured, the woman nevertheless owns the pictorial space. Her gaze is direct, and despite all the distressed surface that surrounds her, her expression conveys both confidence and caution.

In another image, an elderly man sits by himself in a rundown café, surrounded by empty chairs (the implication is clear – men and women of fighting age, adults who might be his friends or relatives, are otherwise occupied). The man looks to the floor, pensively. It would be easy to read this as a maudlin image, but only if one does not take into account the man’s perfectly folded scarf, tidy appearance and flawlessly knotted turban. This is not a bedraggled survivor, but rather a man whose fate, which we can only assume has been very likely tainted by violence, has not robbed him of his innate sense of self-presentation, indeed his natty style.
The standout image from Thousand, for me, is a blunt head-and-shoulders portrait of a bearded man in his mid-40s (my age), dressed in a military-style jacket and sporting a haphazardly wound turban. Alarmingly handsome, in that crinkly Harrison Ford way, the man could be a Hazara movie star. His sideways glance is caught midway between mocking and crabby, and his mouth is equally uncertain whether to smile or sneer.

Apparently, no matter what one’s situation, the quizzical distrust of the camera remains universal.
Stephen Waddell at Clark & Faria
Until March 20, 55 Mill Street, Building 2, Toronto, www.monteclarkgallery.com

It’s perhaps unfair to compare Stephen Waddell’s photographs of street life in Vancouver and Berlin with Gerszak’s practice. British Columbia is not Afghanistan, parallel booming narcotics trades aside. Waddell has not tasked himself with making a record of a threatened people. Nevertheless, similarities linger.

Both Waddell and Gerszak photograph found people, and thus engage in dialogues about the intrusiveness of the lens and the problematics of capturing strangers without demeaning or otherwise objectifying said subjects. Gerszak’s approach is more direct – his subjects clearly know they are being photographed. Waddell presents a more sneaky, and thus more fraught, strategy. Most of his subjects are not facing the camera: They are recorded with their backs turned or while looking away from the photographer’s front-and-centre position.

When Waddell’s casual, sidestep strategy works, it really works. For instance, an image of a rail-thin older woman taking a break outside of a Berlin cinema, her hip titling sexily away from the focal point, is coy and considered. Is she posing? We can’t know. In another work, a young woman with bright green hair tiptoes across a railway track. We see only the back of her dyed head, and her body wrapped in a cheery summer dress. Did she agree to this photograph? Again, we are limited in what we can know.

The most intriguing photo of the suite is of a street person pushing a packed, bright-blue shopping cart. I write “street person” with confidence only after asking the gallerist some core questions: Is this an actor? If not, does Waddell know this person? Did the subject agree to be photographed? I am very suspicious of photographers who photograph the poor and possibly abject, and I hate, to red-eyed rage, the poverty tourism generated by too many photographers in this country.

Another reason I grilled the gallerist is that the person pushing the cart is wearing a bright-green goblin Halloween mask – an inherently performative gesture. This mask, I learned, was the central reason for Waddell deciding to photograph someone he sees every day in his Vancouver neighbourhood.

Without question, Waddell’s magpie-sharp eye for accidental, found colour combinations is sharp and smart, as witnessed in his many photographs of Berlin’s non-stop, carnivalesque vibe. But to think that all Waddell saw of this person, who may or may not be living in diminished circumstances, was the mask, that Waddell may have read this person as a mere visual stimulant, not a human being, unnerved me. So, I asked.

Waddell, I’m told, is familiar with his subject and the subject was aware of the camera. Fine.

Perhaps in an age when we are all being reduced to visual fodder, through Facebook and other image-generating/delivering systems, Waddell’s half-considered, half-accidental approach to photographing “the other” is the best we can hope for.
Whatever you decide about the humanistic implications of Waddell’s work, you can never say the artist takes a boring picture. The amount of unpacking his see-saw semiotics require will keep any viewer busy for hours.

Source,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/arts/rm-vaughan/photos-from-gerszak-waddell-highlight-visual-distance/article1920741/?utm_medium=Feeds%3A%20RSS%2FAtom&utm_source=Toronto&utm_content=1920741

Bamiyan Buddhas once glowed in red, white and blue : Eurek Alert

Bamiyan Buddhas once glowed in red, white and blue
TUM conservators research the ruins of the statues and offer an outlook on the prospect of restoration
This release is available in Spanish, French and German.

IMAGE: The illustration shows the colored appearance of the Bamiyan Buddhas’ robes at the end of the 10th century. Parts damaged in later periods, which cannot be reconstructed, are made visible.

Credit: Arnold Metzinger

The world watched in horror as Taliban fanatics ten years ago blew up the two gigantic Buddha statues that had since the 6th century looked out over the Bamiyan Valley in what is now Afghanistan. Located on the Silk Road, until the 10th century the 55 and 38 meter tall works of art formed the centerpiece of one of the world's largest Buddhist monastic complexes. Thousands of monks tended countless shrines in the niches and caves that pierced a kilometer-long cliff face.

Since the suppression of the Taliban regime, European and Japanese experts, working on behalf of UNESCO and coordinated by the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), have been endeavoring to secure the remains and restore access to the statues. The fragments are being very carefully examined, as prior to the explosion the Buddha statues had barely been researched. For a year and a half now, scientists from the Chair of Restoration, Art Technology and Conservation Science have been studying several hundred fragments at the TUM. Their findings not only contribute to our understanding of this world cultural heritage site, they may also enable the parts recovered to be reassembled:



Coloration: "The Buddhas once had an intensely colorful appearance," says Professor Erwin Emmerling. His team discovered that prior to the conversion of the region to Islam, the statues were overpainted several times, presumably because the colors had faded. The outer robes, or sangati, were painted dark blue on the inside and pink, and later bright orange, on top. In a further phase, the larger Buddha was painted red and the smaller white, while the interior of the robes was repainted in a paler blue. The graphic reconstruction undertaken by the TUM researchers confirms ancient traditions: sources as far back as the 11th century speak of one red Buddha and one moon-white. The other parts of the figures may possibly have had a white priming coat, but that can no longer be proven beyond doubt.

IMAGE: Restorers from the Technische Universitaet Muenchen have analyzed hundreds of fragments of the Bamiyan Buddhas.

Credit: Catharina Blaensdorf / TU Muenche

Construction technique: The statues themselves were hewn out of the cliff; however, the flowing garments were formed by craftsmen using clay, which was applied in two or three layers. The remains display an astonishing degree of artistic skill. "The surfaces are perfectly smooth – of a quality otherwise only found in fired materials such as porcelain," says Professor Emmerling. In the clay, the TUM conservators found straw and chaff which absorb moisture, animal hairs which stabilize the plaster like fine glass fibers, and quartz and other additives which prevent shrinkage. The bottom layer of plaster was held in place with ropes attached to small wooden pegs. This allowed the craftsmen of old to apply unusually thick layers of up to eight centimeters. "These have survived not only nearly 1500 years of history, but even the explosion in some parts," adds Professor Emmerling in amazement.


Dating: Previous attempts to determine when the statues originated were estimates based on the style of the Buddha's robes or similar criteria. Now mass spectrometer tests at the ETH Zurich and the University of Kiel have determined the age of the organic material in the clay layers. The TUM scientists have, as a result, been able to date the construction of the smaller Buddha to between 544 and 595 and the larger Buddha between 591 and 644.


Conservation: How can the fragments at this world heritage site be conserved for the future? The ICOMOS teams have in the meantime stacked the ruins in temporary warehouses in the Bamiyan Valley. Larger pieces have been covered over in situ. "However, that will only last for a few years, because the sandstone is very porous," Professor Emmerling explains. Conventional methods of conservation are out of the question. "On this scale, under the climatic conditions in the Bamiyan Valley, the behavior of the synthetic resins usually used would vary too widely relative to the natural rock." Expert conservator Professor Emmerling has therefore joined forces with Consolidas, a company founded by a TUM graduate, to refine a process recently developed by the latter for possible use on the Buddha fragments: instead of synthetic resins, it might be possible to inject an organic silicon compound in the stone.

IMAGE: The bottom layer of the Bamiyan Buddhas' plaster was held in place with ropes.

Credit: Edmund Melzl / ICOMOS

In addition, the TUM conservators are also working on a 3D model of the cliff face that shows all of the pieces in their former position. Professor Emmerling considers a reconstruction of the smaller Buddha to be fundamentally possible – he argues in favor of reassembling the recovered parts, rather than attempting to reconstruct the original condition in antiquity. As far as the larger Buddha is concerned, in view of its depth of around 12 meters, Professor Emmerling is more skeptical. The smaller figure with a depth of around two meters was more along the lines of a relief. However, even to restore this figure, there are political and practical obstacles to overcome. Conservation of the fragments would require the construction of a small factory in the Bamiyan Valley – alternatively some 1400 rocks weighing up to two tons each would have to be transported to Germany. A conference to be held in Paris next week will consider the continuing fate of the Buddhas.


###
Contact:
Prof. Erwin Emmerling
Technische Universitaet Muenchen
Lehrstuhl für Restaurierung, Kunsttechnologie und Konservierungswissenschaft
Tel.: 089 21124 -559 / -568
E-mail: emmerling@tum.de

Source,
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2011-02/tum-bbo022511.php

German scientists eye Afghan Buddha reconstruction

(AFP)

BERLIN — German scientists said Friday they believed it possible to reconstruct one of the world-famous Bamiyan Buddhas dynamited by the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, prompting worldwide condemnation.

Scientists from the University of Munich, in southern Germany, have examined fragments of the statues -- the world's largest Buddhas -- and concluded that the smaller one could be pieced together.

The two sculptures, 53 metres (173 feet) and 35 metres tall, had stood sentinel for 1,500 years in Bamiyan province before they were blown up by Islamists who believed them to be idolatrous.

Erwin Emmerling, the leader of the team sifting through hundreds of fragments, "considers a reconstruction of the smaller Buddha to be fundamentally possible," the university said in a statement.

"As far as the larger Buddha is concerned, in view of its depth (thickness) of around 12 metres, Professor Emmerling is more sceptical," it said.

Nevertheless, the university cited "political and practical" obstacles to rebuilding the precious statues.

Either a small factory would have to be built in the Bamiyan valley or some 1,400 rocks weighing up to two tonnes each would have to be transported to Germany. Japanese funding could reportedly be used to rebuild the sculptures.

They were once painted a variety of colours, the scientists said, including dark blue, pink, orange, red and white.

"The Buddhas once had an intensely colourful appearance," Emmerling said.

Based on their investigation, the scientists also dated the smaller Buddha to between 544 and 595 AD. The bigger Buddha was built between 591 and 644, they said.

A conference in Paris to debate the future of the Buddhas is expected to take place next week, the statement said.

The niches where they once stood overlooking Bamiyan city, the eponymous capital of the province, are being restored as a UN World Heritage site.

بحران در مجلس نمایندگان، قدرت سیاسی و خواسته های قومی

توفیق نیافتن نمایندگان پارلمان درانتخاب رئیس این مجلس پس از برگذاری چهار
دوره انتخابات پر تنش و پرچالش، نه بخاطر قحطی رجال سیاسی است و نه الزاما نشانه آزادی های دمکراتیک در یک فرایند مدنی، بلکه نشانگر نوعی شکست و گسستی است که پس از ده سال تلاش و امید داخلی و تکاپو و حمایت خارجی از روند تربیت مدنی سیاستمداران افغانستان و بهسازی نظام سیاسی دراین کشور، صورت گرفته است.

پریشانی در نظام اندیشه سیاسی

کند ذهنی رهبران سیاسی افغانستان در درک شرایط پیچیده و نا توانی آنها در ایجاد تغییرات ذهنی و اخلاق سیاسی، موجب شده است که فرصتهای ده ساله پس از سقوط رژیم طالبان، برای ایجاد و تقویت نظم مدنی و تجربه دولتسازی، به تدریج به غفلت سپری گردد.

پس از قرارداد بن در سال ٢٠٠١ که نظارت و حمایت جامعه بین المللی از فرایند صلح و استقرار نظام سیاسی، تنگتر، مسلط تر و نزدیکتر بود، روند کلی اوضاع سیاسی و سیر تعامل رهبران و سیاستمداران افغانستان در حوزه قدرت و جامعه نیز، موجه تر و منضبط تر می نمود.

در تمام گزینش ها و گفتمان هایی که پیرامون دولت موقت، دولت انتقالی و یا دور نخست انتخابات ریاست جمهوری و پارلمانی انجام شد، توافق و تعامل بر سیره و منش خویشتندارانه شکیبایی و مسالمت جویی استوار بود اما بعد از سال ٢٠٠٥، که تلاش ناسنجیده و عاطفی برای فاصله گرفتن تدریجی رهبری کشور از حوزه ی نفوذ و تاثیرحامیان بیرونی تبارز یافت. نه تنها استقلال سیاسی و ارتقای ظرفیت سیاسی ـ مدیریتی تامین نشد بلکه هر روز به چالش تدریجی در روابط دوستانه با حامیان بین المللی دامن زده شد و از دیگرسو، نوعی فرسایش و نا خویشتنداری نیز در تعامل ارکان دولت و در میان بازیگران سیاست کلان کشور، مجال ظهور پیدا کرد.

چهار دور انتخابات برای گزینش رئیس مجلس نمایندگان، نشان داد که هیچ یک از کاندیداهای دو دور اخیر نتوانسته اند آرای سیاف و قانونی را کسب کنند. چنین موضوعی این گمان را تقویت می کند که دو فرد یاد شده، با توجه به این که بیشترین شانس را در میان حامیان و هوادان خود دارند، ممکن است سناریویی در کار باشد که بازهم به بازگشت و کاندید شدن آنان منجر گردد.
در سالهای پسین، در همه مقاطع مهم و تحولات بزرگی مانند انتخابات ریاست جمهوری و انتخابات پارلمانی و یا پدیده های سیاسی ـ داخلی دیگر، بازیگران سیاسی تا سرحد ستیزه های خطرساز پیش رفته اند و روند ملی را دچار آسیبهای جدی نموده اند.

این نشانه هارا به روشنی می توان درانتخابات دور دوم ریاست جمهوری و نیز پارلمانی دید. تنش، تخلف و تقابل گستره و پر مخاطره ای که در فرایند این دو مرحله ی انتخاباتی و بصورت نا معقول تر در بحران بازگشایی شورای ملی پدید آمد، نوعی بازگشت به سنت های قومی سیاست ورزی و رجوع به اخلاق سیاسی دوره جنگهای داخلی را بازتولید کرد.

اکنون اما، نا امیدی، بی اعتباری و نا کامی ای که در جریان انتخاب رئیس پارلمان اتفاق افتاده، تجلی پریشانی عمیقی در تعامل ملی و عقیم ماندن اندیشه سیاسی و درک و تعهد ملی در میان رهبران، سیاستمداران وحتی روشنفکران افغانستان می باشد که از پند نیاموزی سیاسی، فقدان درک قواعد بازی و مساحت محدود عقلانیت و خرد خود بنیاد این نخبگان، نشأت می گیرد.

قدرت سیاسی وخواسته های قومی

به نظر می رسد بن بست پدید آمده در انتخاب ریس مجلس نمایندگان، پیش از آن که بصورت ساده، درصف بندی سه جبهه " دولت"، " اپوزیسیون" و"بی طرف ها" تعریف گردد، نیازمند دید عمیقتر و توضیح جامعه شناختی از موزایک قومی افغانستان می باشد.

تعمق در ترکیب قومی اعضای مجلس نمایندگان در دور جدید، الگوی واقع بینانه تری در تحلیل و بازشناسی بحران های سیاسی ـ ملی به دست می دهد که درک کنیم مشکل انتخاب رئیس شوری اساسا ریشه درمفروضه چگونگی پدیده توزیع قدرت دارد نه الزاما در جناح بندی های سیاسی و یا گروه بندی های فکری ـ ایدئولوژیک.

براساس یک بر رسی، از مجموع ۲۴۹ عضو مجلس نمایندگان، ۹۸ کرسی به پشتون ها، ۷۲ کرسی به تاجیک ها، ۵۲ کرسی به هزاره ها و ۱۹ کرسی دیگر به ازبکها اختصاص یافته و اقلیت های قومی دیگر در مجلس صاحب هشت کرسی شده اند.

این آمار صرف نظر از میزان شمارگان، بیانگر تکثر و تنوعی است که ساختار قومی افغانستان را آیینه داری می کند و همواره در تاریخ سیاسی ـ اجتماعی این کشور منشا گوناگونی فرهنگی، نا همگونی اجتماعی، شکافهای فعال ساختاری و نا شکیبایی های سیاسی بوده است.

پس از ورود و خروج نیروهای شوروی سابق از افغانستان، موازنه ی سنتی قدرت در افغانستان فروریخت و در آرایش تازه، گروههای دیگر قومی فرصت ظهور سیاسی و تبلور اجتماعی پیدا کردند. تاجیک ها، مهمترین گروه قومی بودند که با پیروزی مجاهدین، قدرت سیاسی را بدست آوردند و به مدت ٥ سال در کابل فرمان راندند.


یونس قانونی رئیس پیشین مجلس می گوید اگر یکی از کسانی که در دوره های چهارگانه قبلی نامزد ریاست مجلس بودند، دوباره نامزد شوند، او نیز کاندیدا خواهد بود
ظهور و تسلط طالبان بر افغانستان اما، به اعاده دوباره قدرت سیاسی به پشتون ها منجر شد. با ورود آمریکا و ائتلاف بین المللی به افغانستان، هرچند رژیم قبیله ای ـ مذهبی طالبان سقوط کرد اما برمبنای معاهده و مواقتنامه بن، سنت سیاسی توزیع قدرت تجدید شد و مشروعیت بین المللی پیدا کرد.

برمبنای این سنت، برای نخستین بار، نوعی سلسله مراتب درتعریف و توزیع قدرت سیاسی شکل گرفت. این سلسله مراتب در نماد رئیس جمهوری پشتون بعنوان قدرت نخست، معاون اول تاجیک به مثابه قدرت دوم و معاون دوم هزاره در ردیف قدرت سوم، تمثیل می گردد. مدعا و مصداق اجتماعی تبلور این سلسله مراتب در دو دوره انتخابات ریاست جمهوری نیز به نمایش در آمد. برمبنای این سنجش( نه چندان دقیق وغیر قابل اتکا) کاندید پشتون ها در رتبه نخست، کاندید تاجیک ها در رتبه دوم وکاندید هزاره ها در ردیف سوم قرار گرفته اند.

این که این نماد تا چه حد از حقایق عینی و واقعیتهای قومی افغانستان نمایندگی می کند، موضوع دیگری است اما آنچه که قابل طرح، درخور سنجش و شایسته اندیشه گری است این است که همه طرفها و اقوام عمده، با استدلال ها و مبتنی بر توقعات و مطالبات مخصوص به خود، از نحوه چیدمان قدرت سیاسی نقش و میزان نقش و حضور خود درساختار نظام دولتی ناراضی هستند.

تاجیک ها که رقیب اصلی پشتون ها درتعامل قدرت سیاسی هستند، پس از تجربه حکومت بر کابل، نوستالوژی بازگشت به این دوره را همیشه در آرزوی سیاسی خویش حفظ کرده اند. دراین میان، هزاره ها وازبک ها، مدعی رقابت در قدرت نیستند اما خواهان مشارکت درساختار قدرت و سهم درخور از نظام سیاسی و امتیازات ملی می باشند.

این دو قوم در فرایند تعامل قدرت میان پشتون ها و تاجیک ها، نقش مهم و متوازن کننده را دارند. گرایش سیاسی و ائتلاف استراتژیک این دو قوم با هرکدام از دو گروه مدعی قدرت سیاسی، می تواند تعیین کننده معادله چیدمان قدرت باشد.

در ماجرای انتخاب رئیس مجلس نمایندگان، پدیده توزیع قدرت قومی نقش تعیین کننده ای ایفا می کند. مقام ریاست مجلس نمایندگان، تنها موقعیتی بود که در دور گذشته از کنترل پشتون ها خارج بود. تقریبا تمامی گروه ها و جناح های سیاسی پشتون این بار به تصاحب ریاست پارلمان چشم دوخته اند. ظاهرا به نظر می رسد حامد کرزی نیز به دلیل نگاه قومی و هم بخاطر یک کاسه شدن ارکان دولتی، شدیدا در تلاش است که این مقام در اختیار گروه قومی وسیاسی خود وی قرار بگیرد.

نیروی متوازن کننده و ائتلاف های شکننده

پیش ازجریان رأی گیری برای انتخاب ریس مجلس نمایندگان، نمایندگان هزاره، گویا با یونس قانونی به توافقاتی رسیده بودند تا از وی حمایت کنند اما آنگونه که در چهار دوره رای گیری روشن شد، این توافقات چندان محکم و قطعی نبوده است. به نظر می رسد این حکایت، تابلویی است از وضعیت آشفته سیاسی و عمق ناپایداری ها و بی اعتمادی هایی که در جان و جهان سیاستمداران و رهبران قومی افغاستان تنیده است و بخوبی در جریان بن بست انتخاب رئیس مجلس نمایندگان تبلور یافته است.

هزاره ها و بخش زیادی از ازبک ها در سیاستمداری و فرایند چانه زنی امروزه کشور، از چند خلا و مشکل بزرگ رنج می برند:

نخست فقدان رهبری سیاسی متمرکز، موثر و مقتدر.

دوم، فقدان اهداف تعریف شده و روشن استراتژیک.

سوم، گرایش های جناحی ودرون گروهی متفاوت، وگاه متضاد.

چهارم، ظهور نسل جدیدی از سیاستگران و بازیگران که عمدتا از تجربه، توانایی و حمایت لازم در چانه زنی ها برخوردار نیستند و بیشتر فردی و مستقل عمل می کنند.

پنجم، تجربه ی ناکام از ائتلافهای سیاسی با سایر گروههای قومی وگرفتار شدن دربحران شک وبی اعتمادی.

این خصوصیات سیاسی بازیگران عرصه ی سیاست هزاره ها وازبک ها، در نتایج چانه زنی بر سر توافق با یونس قانونی و یا عبدالرب رسول سیاف نیز تبلور پیدا کرد.


عبدالرب رسول سیاف رقیب اصلی یونس قانونی برای ریاست مجلس تاکید دارد که برای حل بحران کنونی باید به کمیته نظارت از قانون اساسی مراجعه شود
چهار دور انتخابات برای گزینش رئیس مجلس نمایندگان، نشان داد که هیچ یک از کاندیداهای دو دور اخیر نتوانسته اند آرای سیاف و قانونی را کسب کنند. چنین موضوعی این گمان را تقویت می کند که دو فرد یاد شده، با توجه به این که بیشترین شانس را در میان حامیان و هوادان خود دارند، ممکن است سناریویی در کار باشد که بازهم به بازگشت و کاندید شدن آنان منجر گردد.

حال، پرسش اساسی این است که اگر چنین اتفاقی بیفتد، آیا نمایندگان هزاره و ازبک با توجه به تنشهای پدید آمده در روزهای اخیر، کدام گزینه را انتخاب خواهند کرد؟ و آیا مجلس نمایندگان بعنوان یک مرجع دمکراتیک و قانونگذار، هویت های قومی و رویکردهای قبیله ای را وارد فاز تازه ای در حوزه چانه زنی های سیاسی نخواهد کرد؟ و آیا این خطر که گرایش های قومی در مجلس نمایندگان به قوت خود باقی بماند و نتواند به مرور زمان تبدیل به یک گرایش ملی شود، بیشتر از پیش احساس نمی شود.

حمزه واعظی

نویسنده و پژوهشگر افغان در اسلو

Source,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2011/02/110225_l09_af_parliament_problems.shtml

The failed state we’re in

Clare Lockhart 29th June 2008 — Issue 147

The international community has spent billions on reconstructing Afghanistan—yet the country has made dismayingly little progress. It's time for a radical new approach to state-building

We would like to tell you the story of $150m going up in smoke,” said the young villager. “We heard on the radio that there was going to be a reconstruction programme in our region to help us rebuild our houses after coming back from exile, and we were very pleased.”

This was the summer of 2002. The village was in a remote part of Bamiyan province, in Afghanistan’s central highlands, and several hours’ drive from the provincial capital—utterly cut off from the world. UN agencies and NGOs were rushing to provide “quick impact” projects to help Afghan citizens in the aftermath of war. $150m could have transformed the lives of the inhabitants of villages like this one.

But it was not to be, as the young man explained. “After many months, very little had happened. We may be illiterate, but we are not stupid. So we went to find out what was going on. And this is what we discovered: the money was received by an agency in Geneva, who took 20 per cent and subcontracted the job to another agency in Washington DC, who also took 20 per cent. Again it was subcontracted and another 20 per cent was taken; and this happened again when the money arrived in Kabul. By this time there was very little money left; but enough for someone to buy wood in western Iran and have it shipped by a shipping cartel owned by a provincial governor at five times the cost of regular transportation. Eventually some wooden beams reached our villages. But the beams were too large and heavy for the mud walls that we can build. So all we could do was chop them up and use them for firewood.”

Source,

http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2008/06/thefailedstatewerein/