February 17, 2011
THE federal government has re-embraced multiculturalism in a key speech by the Immigration Minister, Chris Bowen, tackling voter fear of Islamic extremism and outlining a new anti-racism strategy.
Labor's new multicultural policy was released amid accusations that the Coalition was ''stealing sound bites from One Nation'', and with the Opposition Leader, Tony Abbott, conceding attacks on asylum-seeker funerals had gone ''too far''.
Mr Bowen told the Sydney Institute last night it had become fashionable to blame multiculturalism for terrorism, but the Australian experience was different.
Advertisement: Story continues below ''It is right for Australians to be concerned about extremism - whether Islamic or otherwise … [but] to cast all Islamic migrants or all members of any religious group as somehow unworthy of their place in our national community … tars the many with the extremist views of the very few and does an injustice to all.''
He said it was counter-intuitive to assume that most migrants wanted to change Australia. ''Allegations of migrants wanting to come to Australia to convert the populace and turn it into a replica of their homelands ignore the truth.''
Hazaras, who make up a large percentage of asylum-seeker boat arrivals, had fled religious extremism in Afghanistan, and ''just like previous groups of migrants'' were attracted by Australia's values, he said.
Mr Bowen outlined a new policy which he said promoted social cohesion and valued diversity.
The government will appoint a 10-person multicultural council which will have a wider scope than the existing advisory body, establish a national anti-racism strategy, and reinstate the word ''multicultural'' in Kate Lundy's title of parliamentary secretary for immigration.
A youth sports program will also promote people from ethnically diverse backgrounds mixing together.
Labor's new multicultural push comes after the opposition immigration spokesman, Scott Morrison, said on Australia Day that he was ''reluctant to use the term'', and multiculturalism should not be reduced to an ''unrestricted licence to replicate your old culture in a new land''.
The Howard government dropped official use of the term, and the last federal multiculturalism statement was issued in 2003.
But during last year's election, Labor also shied away from a multiculturalism policy, sensitive to voter perceptions in western Sydney of special treatment for migrants, and had dropped the term from Senator Lundy's title.
Mr Bowen said last night: ''I'm not afraid to use the word multiculturalism.''
He said multiculturalism had worked and was a marker of a liberal society. Australia differed from Europe in that it was not a guest worker society, and migrants were expected to become citizens. But Australia could not accept the benefits of a diverse population and then shun the culture of migrants it had invited, or suspect they would not integrate, he said.
''If people do not feel part of society, this can lead to alienation and, ultimately, social disunity.''
Almost half (44 per cent) of Australians were born overseas or had a parent born overseas.
Mr Bowen said the government would counter extremism, and singled out sharia as inconsistent with multiculturalism. Where there is any clash between migrant cultures and the rule of law or freedom ''traditional Australian values win out'', he said.
The Australian Multicultural Advisory Council, set up by the Rudd government in 2008, recommended last year that an independent body be established to advise on a multicultural strategy.
The former Liberal prime minister Malcolm Fraser was credited with institutionalising multiculturalism as policy, but Mr Bowen said it was uncertain it would remain ''above the fray of the daily political football match''.
Yesterday the government put the cost of flying 21 Christmas Island detainees to Sydney this week for the funerals of relatives who died in the December boat tragedy at $300,000.
Source,
http://www.smh.com.au/national/labors-call-fear-extremists-not-migrants-20110216-1awmn.html
Azaranica is a non-biased news aggregator on Hazaras. The main aim is to promote understanding and respect for cultural identities by highlighting the realities they face on daily basis...Hazaras have been the victim of active persecution and discrimination and one of the reasons among many has been the lack of information, awareness, and disinformation.
Thursday, February 17, 2011
Balkanisation of Afghanistan cuts against the grain
Shaukat Qadir
Last Updated: Feb 17, 2011
On the verge of exit from Afghanistan, the US and its allies might be tempted to leave a Balkanised version of that country in their wake. The idea, championed by Robert Blackwill, a former US ambassador to India, is seen as something of an end game, where the country is divided along ethnic lines.
A divided Afghanistan, the thinking goes, would prevent a full-scale return of the Taliban by reducing its presence to the Pashtun-dominated south and, in the process, contain the threat. The presumedly peaceful north could embark on nation-building while military operations and counter-terrorism could continue in the south. It sounds simple. But is the analysis missing something?
The logic of a divided Afghanistan is based on three premises. First, there was no such country as Afghanistan until Russia and Britain decided to create it in 1893 as a buffer between the Russian and British empires. Second, Taliban support is confined to the Pashtun-dominated south. And last, a division along ethnic lines would be acceptable to all parties.
All three premises are appealing to consider - and all three are dead wrong.
The first premise is manifestly false. In 1747, Ahmed Shah Durrani began to carve out an empire covering almost all of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Even though the Durrani empire had disintegrated by the late 19th century, the extension into the Indian sub-continent and Iran laid a regional framework tied to Afghanistan.
In fact, that political entity was only imperfectly divided by the British-imposed Durand Line in 1893, which drew an arbitrary division between Afghanistan and British India, along the border of present-day Pakistan. The political cohesion of the area was pulled apart by the Great Game rivalry between Britain and Russia, but Afghanistan has disputed the Durand Line since its creation.
The second premise of Balkanisation is also dangerously misleading. While the Taliban are entirely Pashtun, and the leader of the Quetta Shura, Mullah Mohammed Omar, hails from Kandahar in the south, neither Pashtuns nor Taliban support is confined there. Qunduz is a Pashtun-dominated region in the extreme north. The provinces of Logar, Nangarhar and Paktia immediately south and east of Kabul are Pashtun dominated. And west and north of Kabul, Jalalabad and the region bordering Pakistan is also Pashtun.
The bulk of the Hazara ethnic group lives in central Afghanistan, though they are a minority in every province. While Hazaras are almost exclusively Shiites and have often been discriminated against by Pashtun groups, predominantly Pashtun areas have historically hosted peoples of many religions including Christians, Buddhists, Sikhs and Parsis. The arrival of the Taliban, of course, changed this acceptance of this religious diversity.
Finally, the belief that Afghanistan would happily accept a state carved along ethnic divisions is also wrong. Despite the country's ethnic and religious diversity, there has always been a national character among Afghan people, who pride themselves on being Afghan first. Afghan Tajiks may dominate the region bordering Tajikistan, and Uzbeks near Uzbekistan, but they are all Afghans.
This sense of national identity has been bolstered by another factor that the Americans have perhaps overlooked. Afghans have a vested interest in a united country that can better exploit its mineral wealth and keeps intact the economic corridor that runs through Central Asia. While outsiders might not value the economic unity of the country, it should be the foundation of the country's future development. If divided, some of the constituent parts would quickly become economically inviable.
It remains to be seen what form Afghanistan will take after the United States and its allies make their exit. But that exit is on the horizon. As I have argued in previous articles, last month's visit of the US vice president Joe Biden and his return two days ago may signal a changing US strategy in the region. Mr Biden is the greatest proponent in Washington of a diminished US troop presence on the subcontinent, and his visits will be dealing with an exit strategy.
But regardless, events may outpace the Americans. The so-called Rabbani initiative, named for the Tajik veteran of the Afghan-Soviet war Burhanuddin Rabbani, proposes rapprochement with the Taliban in a framework that only includes Afghans. Obviously, that excludes America's hand from shaping the post-invasion order. Mr Rabbani made that proposal to the Pashtun jirga in Nangarhar
Just as the Americans are being pushed towards the exit, their plans for Afghanistan are becoming further irrelevant. Those who try to impose an outsider's solution on Afghanistan will be making the same mistakes of many wars past.
Brig Shaukat Qadir is a former Pakistani infantry officer
Source,
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/balkanisation-of-afghanistan-cuts-against-the-grain?pageCount=2
Last Updated: Feb 17, 2011
On the verge of exit from Afghanistan, the US and its allies might be tempted to leave a Balkanised version of that country in their wake. The idea, championed by Robert Blackwill, a former US ambassador to India, is seen as something of an end game, where the country is divided along ethnic lines.
A divided Afghanistan, the thinking goes, would prevent a full-scale return of the Taliban by reducing its presence to the Pashtun-dominated south and, in the process, contain the threat. The presumedly peaceful north could embark on nation-building while military operations and counter-terrorism could continue in the south. It sounds simple. But is the analysis missing something?
The logic of a divided Afghanistan is based on three premises. First, there was no such country as Afghanistan until Russia and Britain decided to create it in 1893 as a buffer between the Russian and British empires. Second, Taliban support is confined to the Pashtun-dominated south. And last, a division along ethnic lines would be acceptable to all parties.
All three premises are appealing to consider - and all three are dead wrong.
The first premise is manifestly false. In 1747, Ahmed Shah Durrani began to carve out an empire covering almost all of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Even though the Durrani empire had disintegrated by the late 19th century, the extension into the Indian sub-continent and Iran laid a regional framework tied to Afghanistan.
In fact, that political entity was only imperfectly divided by the British-imposed Durand Line in 1893, which drew an arbitrary division between Afghanistan and British India, along the border of present-day Pakistan. The political cohesion of the area was pulled apart by the Great Game rivalry between Britain and Russia, but Afghanistan has disputed the Durand Line since its creation.
The second premise of Balkanisation is also dangerously misleading. While the Taliban are entirely Pashtun, and the leader of the Quetta Shura, Mullah Mohammed Omar, hails from Kandahar in the south, neither Pashtuns nor Taliban support is confined there. Qunduz is a Pashtun-dominated region in the extreme north. The provinces of Logar, Nangarhar and Paktia immediately south and east of Kabul are Pashtun dominated. And west and north of Kabul, Jalalabad and the region bordering Pakistan is also Pashtun.
The bulk of the Hazara ethnic group lives in central Afghanistan, though they are a minority in every province. While Hazaras are almost exclusively Shiites and have often been discriminated against by Pashtun groups, predominantly Pashtun areas have historically hosted peoples of many religions including Christians, Buddhists, Sikhs and Parsis. The arrival of the Taliban, of course, changed this acceptance of this religious diversity.
Finally, the belief that Afghanistan would happily accept a state carved along ethnic divisions is also wrong. Despite the country's ethnic and religious diversity, there has always been a national character among Afghan people, who pride themselves on being Afghan first. Afghan Tajiks may dominate the region bordering Tajikistan, and Uzbeks near Uzbekistan, but they are all Afghans.
This sense of national identity has been bolstered by another factor that the Americans have perhaps overlooked. Afghans have a vested interest in a united country that can better exploit its mineral wealth and keeps intact the economic corridor that runs through Central Asia. While outsiders might not value the economic unity of the country, it should be the foundation of the country's future development. If divided, some of the constituent parts would quickly become economically inviable.
It remains to be seen what form Afghanistan will take after the United States and its allies make their exit. But that exit is on the horizon. As I have argued in previous articles, last month's visit of the US vice president Joe Biden and his return two days ago may signal a changing US strategy in the region. Mr Biden is the greatest proponent in Washington of a diminished US troop presence on the subcontinent, and his visits will be dealing with an exit strategy.
But regardless, events may outpace the Americans. The so-called Rabbani initiative, named for the Tajik veteran of the Afghan-Soviet war Burhanuddin Rabbani, proposes rapprochement with the Taliban in a framework that only includes Afghans. Obviously, that excludes America's hand from shaping the post-invasion order. Mr Rabbani made that proposal to the Pashtun jirga in Nangarhar
Just as the Americans are being pushed towards the exit, their plans for Afghanistan are becoming further irrelevant. Those who try to impose an outsider's solution on Afghanistan will be making the same mistakes of many wars past.
Brig Shaukat Qadir is a former Pakistani infantry officer
Source,
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/balkanisation-of-afghanistan-cuts-against-the-grain?pageCount=2
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
SBIFF 2011 Winners
Best Documentary Film Awardwent to The Boy Mir: Ten Years in Afghanistan,(US Premiere) directed by Phil Grabsky. Ten years in the making, this appealing documentary follows a young boy, Mir, from age 8 to 18, as he grows to adulthood with his family in rural Afghanistan. After the award-winning THE BOY WHO PLAYS ON THE BUDDHAS OF BAMIYAN (SBIFF, 2004) introduced 8-year-old Mir, the filmmakers returned to Afghanistan year after year. After the fall of the Taliban, Mir's family is at last able to leave the Bamiyan caves to return to their distant home in the desert north. It is a hardscrabble life. Mir helps to support the family, plowing and grazing the goats on seemingly leafless mountain slopes. His dreams of becoming a teacher-or even president!-are fading, but through it all he keeps his enthusiasm and his smile. THE BOY MIR: TEN YEARS IN AFGANISTAN reveals Afghanistan in the context of one family. It is a unique and poignant human-scaled portrait.
Source,
http://www.edhat.com/site/tidbit.cfm?nid=48474
Source,
http://www.edhat.com/site/tidbit.cfm?nid=48474
Lives intersect in 'Lipstick in Afghanistan'
Posted by Sharon Galligar Chance, Las Vegas Review-Journal guest reviewer
For Elsa Murphy, life growing up in her working-class neighborhood never has been easy, but a single swipe of lipstick could give her the confidence and courage she needs to make a difference in war-torn Afghanistan.
Roberta Gately’s debut novel, “Lipstick in Afghanistan,” is the fictionalized accounting of one woman’s unselfish devotion to her job as a nurse in a small mountain village in remote Afghanistan.
When packing for her assignment, Elsa makes sure she includes several tubes of lipstick that infuse her with poise and bravery, never dreaming that those simple tubes of color would change many lives. Elsa trained as an emergency room nurse in Boston, but nothing could have prepared her for the devastation she encounters in the small village of Bamiyan, Afghanistan.
Thrust into the job of managing the small medical clinic and supervising two local doctors, Elsa soon learns to love the humble people who need her care. She makes fast friends with local resident Parween, a young widow who bonds with the American nurse over their affection for lipstick and their overwhelming desire to make things better around them. Elsa also finds a love interest in Mike, a handsome American special forces solider, who is part of the unit assigned to protect Bamiyan from the Taliban.
As the war rages around them, all three lives change through love, friendship and understanding, but all three experience tragedy as well in a beautiful land torn apart by war.
Gately tells the story of Afghanistan in two voices with this fascinating, heart-wrenching novel. She presents Elsa’s story of an impoverished child who longs to make a difference in the world after seeing a magazine story about the genocide in Rwanda. Gately also tells Parween’s story of a charming young girl who marries young, is widowed young and desperately wants to keep her family safe from the evil influences of the Taliban. As their stories intersect, readers will be enthralled with the differences and similarities between the two young women.
Source,
http://www.lvrj.com/blogs/booknook/Lives_intersect_in_Lipstick_in_Afghanistan.html?ref=644
For Elsa Murphy, life growing up in her working-class neighborhood never has been easy, but a single swipe of lipstick could give her the confidence and courage she needs to make a difference in war-torn Afghanistan.
Roberta Gately’s debut novel, “Lipstick in Afghanistan,” is the fictionalized accounting of one woman’s unselfish devotion to her job as a nurse in a small mountain village in remote Afghanistan.
When packing for her assignment, Elsa makes sure she includes several tubes of lipstick that infuse her with poise and bravery, never dreaming that those simple tubes of color would change many lives. Elsa trained as an emergency room nurse in Boston, but nothing could have prepared her for the devastation she encounters in the small village of Bamiyan, Afghanistan.
Thrust into the job of managing the small medical clinic and supervising two local doctors, Elsa soon learns to love the humble people who need her care. She makes fast friends with local resident Parween, a young widow who bonds with the American nurse over their affection for lipstick and their overwhelming desire to make things better around them. Elsa also finds a love interest in Mike, a handsome American special forces solider, who is part of the unit assigned to protect Bamiyan from the Taliban.
As the war rages around them, all three lives change through love, friendship and understanding, but all three experience tragedy as well in a beautiful land torn apart by war.
Gately tells the story of Afghanistan in two voices with this fascinating, heart-wrenching novel. She presents Elsa’s story of an impoverished child who longs to make a difference in the world after seeing a magazine story about the genocide in Rwanda. Gately also tells Parween’s story of a charming young girl who marries young, is widowed young and desperately wants to keep her family safe from the evil influences of the Taliban. As their stories intersect, readers will be enthralled with the differences and similarities between the two young women.
Source,
http://www.lvrj.com/blogs/booknook/Lives_intersect_in_Lipstick_in_Afghanistan.html?ref=644
Monday, February 14, 2011
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