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Saturday, September 10, 2011
From policing 9/11 to studying Dari in Afghanistan
By Amie Ferris-Rotman
BAMIYAN, Afghanistan | Sat Sep 10, 2011 4:37am EDT
(Reuters) - Staff sergeant Luis Badillo prefers to leave his NATO base for weekend dinners, and head instead to local cafes where he can share jokes with Afghan colleagues in their native language.
Since arriving three months ago in beautiful but impoverished central Baimyan province, the 33-year-old New Yorker has stunned his Afghan and U.S. work mates by taking up Dari, one of the country's two main languages.
"It's fantastic seeing him chat to all the guys. We wish all of them would learn," said interpreter Asadullah, of the Army reservist's efforts.
After the Sept 11, 2001 assault on New York and Washington DC., Badillo, who is a New York state police officer, escorted victims' families to the smoldering Ground Zero site.
But he wanted to see first-hand the country where the attack was planned. "I needed to come here at least once and contribute in some way," Badillo told Reuters, in a thick New York accent
"So when my unit said they were looking for volunteers to train the Afghan (police), they didn't have to tell me twice."
Once he arrived, he decided learning the local language was crucial to garnering support for an increasingly unpopular war.
His interest is rare amongst the foreign forces that have been fighting the Taliban for nearly a decade.
U.S. General William Caldwell, who has overseen all NATO training of the Afghan army and police for the last two years, said Badillo is the first U.S. soldier he met to study Dari.
Because there are no language classes for foreign troops, Badillo attended the coalition's literacy class for Afghan security force recruits at the local police training base.
With literacy nationwide under 30 percent, the courses are mandatory for new police recruits.
"As they learned to read and write, so did I," he told Reuters after quickly jotting down notes in the Arabic script used to write Dari, to approving nods from Afghan colleagues.
He peppers conversation with historical tidbits about the province's Silk Road past and the Hazara ethnic group that dominates the area.
"Once people respect you, it's so easy. You speak their language, and it's a whole different world," Badillo said.
He is fortunate to be serving in one of the most peaceful places in Afghanistan, an anti-Taliban bastion whose inhabitants are largely Shi'ite Muslim and were badly mistreated by the Sunni Taliban.
In other parts of the country, U.S. soldiers would be risking their lives by wandering in local markets; here there is not even an Afghan army presence -- Afghan police alone guard the valley once famous for towering, centuries-old Buddha statues blown up by the Taliban.
(Editing by Emma Graham-Harrison and Jonathan Thatcher)
Source,
Reuters
India’s planned investment in Afghanistan
By Simbal Khan
Published: September 9, 2011
The writer is Director Afghanistan and Central Asia at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad
Indian companies appear poised to win the contract for the mining of the 1.8 million ton of Hajigak iron ore deposits in Bamiyan, central Afghanistan. Keen Indian interest in getting a stake in this development of Afghanistan’s natural wealth is evident from the fact that 14 out of the 22 companies shortlisted to submit the formal bids are Indian. The Afghan government announced that the bids are going to be opened in October 2011. However, there is great likelihood that one of the two large Indian consortiums, led by the Steel Authority of India and the National Mineral Development Corporations, are likely to be awarded the contract.
This aggressive Indian bid for a stake in Afghanistan’s natural resource potential comes against a backdrop of several important developments. Since last year, as it has become evident that the US is moving towards a structured withdrawal of combat troops, Indian policy on Afghanistan has come under intense scrutiny and debate in India. The bid for the Hajigak contract by Indian firms, which includes two prominent state-owned entities, signals an end to recriminations of years gone by. At the same time, it serves as a clear policy statement, investing confidence in India’s ability to navigate the changes taking place in Afghanistan.
Moving away from an aid and reconstruction engagement, India like China, seeks to invest in the long-term development of Afghanistan’s abundant natural wealth. Clearly, there are strong geopolitical undertones to this proposed investment; with this bid India positions itself to compete with China in the resource-rich southern Central Asia, while signalling to Pakistan that Indian stakes in Afghanistan’s future go beyond and are independent of the timelines of the US/Nato military presence.
However, the problems that have plagued the success story of the Aynak Copper mines in 2008, awarded to the Chinese consortium, should serve as a cautionary reminder to the Indians. China continues to grapple with several issues at its copper mine in Aynak, including local resentment; security problems; and the unearthing of ancient religious relics, which have all delayed the project from taking off. Significantly, the $800 million mobilisation advance provided by the Chinese to the Afghan government, which was to cover the cost of the deployment of a 1,500 member special security force to guard the Aynak mines, has already been utilised with no sign of the police force.
Another ominous reminder of the problems associated with developing large infrastructural projects amidst war and insecurity is the rehabilitation programme of the old 1950s US-funded Kajaki Dam in Helmand province. The US, which had bombed the dam in 2001, started repairing the power plant in December 2004 and has had several problems since.
As the US shrinks its military footprint and most Nato countries prepare to withdraw their combat troops by 2014, guarding and undertaking large infrastructure projects is likely to get more problematic than before. With this proposed investment, India is likely to be even more invested in the security status quo and the general drift of the US war strategy in Afghanistan, even more so than some Nato member countries such as Britain and Germany. However, the sands of security are likely to shift with the impending shrinkage of US/Nato combat troops on the ground. India has two options: to patiently sit out the impending period of chaos and risk, sinking a large investment in project delays, or to gradually expand its role as a security actor in order to protect its investments and role. Both options have enormous costs which Delhi must ponder before it ‘irons’ its resolve to go ahead with the Hajigak investment.
Published in The Express Tribune, September 10th, 2011.
Source,
The Express Tribune
Published: September 9, 2011
The writer is Director Afghanistan and Central Asia at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad
Indian companies appear poised to win the contract for the mining of the 1.8 million ton of Hajigak iron ore deposits in Bamiyan, central Afghanistan. Keen Indian interest in getting a stake in this development of Afghanistan’s natural wealth is evident from the fact that 14 out of the 22 companies shortlisted to submit the formal bids are Indian. The Afghan government announced that the bids are going to be opened in October 2011. However, there is great likelihood that one of the two large Indian consortiums, led by the Steel Authority of India and the National Mineral Development Corporations, are likely to be awarded the contract.
This aggressive Indian bid for a stake in Afghanistan’s natural resource potential comes against a backdrop of several important developments. Since last year, as it has become evident that the US is moving towards a structured withdrawal of combat troops, Indian policy on Afghanistan has come under intense scrutiny and debate in India. The bid for the Hajigak contract by Indian firms, which includes two prominent state-owned entities, signals an end to recriminations of years gone by. At the same time, it serves as a clear policy statement, investing confidence in India’s ability to navigate the changes taking place in Afghanistan.
Moving away from an aid and reconstruction engagement, India like China, seeks to invest in the long-term development of Afghanistan’s abundant natural wealth. Clearly, there are strong geopolitical undertones to this proposed investment; with this bid India positions itself to compete with China in the resource-rich southern Central Asia, while signalling to Pakistan that Indian stakes in Afghanistan’s future go beyond and are independent of the timelines of the US/Nato military presence.
However, the problems that have plagued the success story of the Aynak Copper mines in 2008, awarded to the Chinese consortium, should serve as a cautionary reminder to the Indians. China continues to grapple with several issues at its copper mine in Aynak, including local resentment; security problems; and the unearthing of ancient religious relics, which have all delayed the project from taking off. Significantly, the $800 million mobilisation advance provided by the Chinese to the Afghan government, which was to cover the cost of the deployment of a 1,500 member special security force to guard the Aynak mines, has already been utilised with no sign of the police force.
Another ominous reminder of the problems associated with developing large infrastructural projects amidst war and insecurity is the rehabilitation programme of the old 1950s US-funded Kajaki Dam in Helmand province. The US, which had bombed the dam in 2001, started repairing the power plant in December 2004 and has had several problems since.
As the US shrinks its military footprint and most Nato countries prepare to withdraw their combat troops by 2014, guarding and undertaking large infrastructure projects is likely to get more problematic than before. With this proposed investment, India is likely to be even more invested in the security status quo and the general drift of the US war strategy in Afghanistan, even more so than some Nato member countries such as Britain and Germany. However, the sands of security are likely to shift with the impending shrinkage of US/Nato combat troops on the ground. India has two options: to patiently sit out the impending period of chaos and risk, sinking a large investment in project delays, or to gradually expand its role as a security actor in order to protect its investments and role. Both options have enormous costs which Delhi must ponder before it ‘irons’ its resolve to go ahead with the Hajigak investment.
Published in The Express Tribune, September 10th, 2011.
Source,
The Express Tribune
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