A media report says an ship carrying more than 200 migrants from the Middle East has sunk off Indonesia.
Saturday, December 17, 2011
Noam Chomsky: New U.S.-Afghan Deal 'part of a Global Program of World Militarization’
BYAFGHAN YOUTH PEACE VOLUNTEERS
DECEMBER 17, 2011
[Editor's. note: This is a transcript of a conversation between members of the Afghan Youth Peace Volunteers and Noam Chomsky, which took place on September 21, 2011. Each question was asked in Dari and translated by Hakim.]
Hakim: We are speaking from the highlands of Bamiyan in central Afghanistan, and we wanted to start off by thanking you sincerely for the guidance and wisdom that you have consistently given through your teaching and speeches in many places. We want to start off with a question from Faiz.
Faiz: In an article by Ahmed Rashid in the New York Times recently, he said that “after 10 years, it should be clear that the war in this region cannot be won purely by military force…. Pakistanis desperately need a new narrative… but where is the leadership to tell this story as it should be told? The military gets away with its antiquated thinking because nobody is offering an alternative, and without an alternative, nothing will improve for a long time.” Do you think there is any leadership in the world today that can propose an alternative non-military solution for Afghanistan, and if not, where or from whom would this leadership for an alternative non-military solution come from?
Noam Chomsky: I think it is well understood among the military leadership and also the political leadership in the United States and its allies, that they cannot achieve a military solution of the kind that they want. This is putting aside the question of whether that goal was ever justified; now, put that aside. Just in their terms, they know perfectly well they cannot achieve a military solution.
Is there an alternative political force that could work towards some sort of political settlement? Well, you know, that actually the major force that would be effective in bringing about that aim is popular opinion. The public is already very strongly opposed to the war and has been for a long time, but that has not translated itself into an active, committed, dedicated popular movement that is seeking to change policy. And that’s what has to be done here.
My own feeling is that the most important consequence of the very significant peace efforts that are underway inside Afghanistan might well be to stimulate popular movements in the West through just people to people contact, which would help impose pressures on the United States, and particularly Britain, to end the military phase of this conflict and move towards what ought to be done: peaceful settlement and honest, realistic economic development.
Abdulai: Dr. Ramazon Bashardost told the Afghan Youth Peace Volunteers once that the people of Afghanistan have no choice because all available options in Afghanistan are bad. So, Afghans have no choice but to choose the least bad of the bad options. In this situation, some Afghans, and in particular many in Kabul, feel that the least bad option is to have the U.S. coalition forces remain in Afghanistan. Do you think that the continued presence of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan is the least bad option? If not, what are the possible truly good options for ordinary Afghans?
Noam Chomsky: I agree that there don’t appear to be any good options, and that we therefore regrettably have to try to seek the least bad of the bad options. Now, that judgment has to be made by Afghans. You’re on the scene. You’re the people who live with the consequences. You are the people who have the right and responsibility to make these delicate and unfortunate choices. I have my own opinion, but it doesn’t carry any weight. What matters are your opinions.
My opinion is that as long as the military forces are there, now, they will probably increase the tensions and undermine the possibilities for a longer term settlement. I think that’s been the record of the past 10 years largely, and that’s the record in other places as well—in Iraq, for example. So, my feeling is that a phased withdrawal of the kind that’s actually contemplated may well be the least bad of the bad options, but combined with other efforts. It’s not enough to just withdraw troops. There have to be alternatives put in place. One of them, for example, which has repeatedly been recommended, is regional cooperation among the regional powers. That would of course include Pakistan, Iran, India, the countries to the north, all of which, together with Afghan representatives among them, might be able to hammer out a development program that would be meaningful and cooperate in implementing it, shifting the focus of activities from killing to reconstructing and building. But the core of issues are going to have to be settled internal to Afghanistan.
Mohammad Hussein: It has been announced that the foreign forces would leave Afghanistan by 2014, and transfer responsibility for security to Afghans. However, what we have before us appears to be a very deceitful, corrupt situation of the U.S. government signing a Strategic Partnership agreement with the Afghan government to place permanent joint military bases in Afghanistan beyond 2024. It feels as if, to the Afghan Youth Peace Volunteers, that the withdrawal by 2014 is therefore inconsequential in light of the larger long term plans to keep forces in Afghanistan. Could you comment on this?
Noam Chomsky: I’m quite sure that those expectations are correct. There is very little doubt that the U.S. government intends to maintain effective military control over Afghanistan by one means or another, either through a client state with military bases, and support for what they’ll call Afghan troops. That’s the pattern elsewhere as well. So, for example, after bombing Serbia in 1999, the United States maintains a huge military base in Kosovo, which was the goal of the bombing. In Iraq, they’re still building military bases even though there is rhetoric about leaving the country. And I presume they will do the same in Afghanistan too, which is regarded by the U.S. as of strategic significance in the long term, within the plans of maintaining control of essentially the energy resources and other resources of the region, including western and Central Asia. So this is a piece of ongoing plans which in fact go back to the Second World War.
Right now, the United States is militarily engaged in one form or another in almost a hundred countries, including bases, special forces operations, support for domestic military and security forces. This is a global program of world militarization, essentially tracing back to headquarters in Washington, and Afghanistan is a part of it. It will be up to Afghans to see if, first of all, if they want this; secondly, if they can act in ways which will exclude it. That’s pretty much what’s happening in Iraq. As late as early 2008, the United States was officially insisting that it maintain military bases and be able to carry out combat operations in Iraq, and that the Iraqi government must privilege U.S. investors for the oil and energy system. Well, Iraqi resistance has compelled the United States to withdraw somewhat from that, substantially, in fact. But the efforts will still continue. These are ongoing conflicts based on long standing principles. Any real success in moving towards demilitarization and reconstruction of relations will have to require primarily the commitment of Afghans, but, as well, the cooperative efforts of popular groups of the Western powers to pressure their own governments.
Faiz: After three decades of war and being at the raw end of regional and global military interference in Afghanistan, the people are feeling lost and without hope. People are even losing hope and not confident that the United Nations, whose charter is to remove the scourge of war from all generations, would be able to offer an alternative solution. We have talked with peace groups about the possibility of a blue ribbon or blue scarf team of individuals, perhaps including Nobel Laureates, who could speak out and make a statement about the dire humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, and perhaps throw open a debate to the world about alternatives for ordinary Afghans who are losing all hope. Do you think that there is any possibility of the United Nations stepping in to offer a different narrative in these dire straits? And is there any possibility of an independent peacemaking blue ribbon team of peace builders who can offer a way out?
Noam Chomsky: One has to bear in mind that the United Nations cannot act independently. It can only act as far as the great powers will permit—that means primarily the United States, also Britain, and France, essentially, the Permanent Members of the Security Council—which limit what the United Nations can do. It can act within the constraints that they impose, and the United States is by far the most influential.
So, just to give one indication of that, take a look at the record of vetoes at the Security Council. In the early days of the United Nations, beginning in the late 1940s, U.S. power was so overwhelming in the world that the United Nations was basically an instrument of the United States. As other industrial powers recovered from the war and decolonization began, the United Nations became somewhat more representative of the people of the world. It became less controlled by the United States and the U.S. began vetoing resolutions. The first U.S. veto was in 1965, and since then, the United States is far in the lead vetoing Security Council resolutions, which blocks action. Now, Britain is second, and no one else is even close. And that continues now. There will probably be another U.S. veto next week. That’s in general the case. If the United States refuses to allow something to happen, the United Nations can’t do anything. Other great powers have also some influence, but less. So, the real question is, will the United States and Britain agree to permit actions of the kind that are outlined in the question. And I think that can come about, but again, we’re back to where we were before.
Abdulai: On behalf of the Afghan youth in Bamiyan, as well as those listening in from Kabul, we thank you for your time with us. We wish you well, and the best of health.
Noam Chomsky: Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to talk to you briefly. It’s a real privilege, and I greatly admire the wonderful work that you’re doing.
This article was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.
The Indydependant
DECEMBER 17, 2011
[Editor's. note: This is a transcript of a conversation between members of the Afghan Youth Peace Volunteers and Noam Chomsky, which took place on September 21, 2011. Each question was asked in Dari and translated by Hakim.]
Hakim: We are speaking from the highlands of Bamiyan in central Afghanistan, and we wanted to start off by thanking you sincerely for the guidance and wisdom that you have consistently given through your teaching and speeches in many places. We want to start off with a question from Faiz.
Faiz: In an article by Ahmed Rashid in the New York Times recently, he said that “after 10 years, it should be clear that the war in this region cannot be won purely by military force…. Pakistanis desperately need a new narrative… but where is the leadership to tell this story as it should be told? The military gets away with its antiquated thinking because nobody is offering an alternative, and without an alternative, nothing will improve for a long time.” Do you think there is any leadership in the world today that can propose an alternative non-military solution for Afghanistan, and if not, where or from whom would this leadership for an alternative non-military solution come from?
Noam Chomsky: I think it is well understood among the military leadership and also the political leadership in the United States and its allies, that they cannot achieve a military solution of the kind that they want. This is putting aside the question of whether that goal was ever justified; now, put that aside. Just in their terms, they know perfectly well they cannot achieve a military solution.
Is there an alternative political force that could work towards some sort of political settlement? Well, you know, that actually the major force that would be effective in bringing about that aim is popular opinion. The public is already very strongly opposed to the war and has been for a long time, but that has not translated itself into an active, committed, dedicated popular movement that is seeking to change policy. And that’s what has to be done here.
My own feeling is that the most important consequence of the very significant peace efforts that are underway inside Afghanistan might well be to stimulate popular movements in the West through just people to people contact, which would help impose pressures on the United States, and particularly Britain, to end the military phase of this conflict and move towards what ought to be done: peaceful settlement and honest, realistic economic development.
Abdulai: Dr. Ramazon Bashardost told the Afghan Youth Peace Volunteers once that the people of Afghanistan have no choice because all available options in Afghanistan are bad. So, Afghans have no choice but to choose the least bad of the bad options. In this situation, some Afghans, and in particular many in Kabul, feel that the least bad option is to have the U.S. coalition forces remain in Afghanistan. Do you think that the continued presence of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan is the least bad option? If not, what are the possible truly good options for ordinary Afghans?
Noam Chomsky: I agree that there don’t appear to be any good options, and that we therefore regrettably have to try to seek the least bad of the bad options. Now, that judgment has to be made by Afghans. You’re on the scene. You’re the people who live with the consequences. You are the people who have the right and responsibility to make these delicate and unfortunate choices. I have my own opinion, but it doesn’t carry any weight. What matters are your opinions.
My opinion is that as long as the military forces are there, now, they will probably increase the tensions and undermine the possibilities for a longer term settlement. I think that’s been the record of the past 10 years largely, and that’s the record in other places as well—in Iraq, for example. So, my feeling is that a phased withdrawal of the kind that’s actually contemplated may well be the least bad of the bad options, but combined with other efforts. It’s not enough to just withdraw troops. There have to be alternatives put in place. One of them, for example, which has repeatedly been recommended, is regional cooperation among the regional powers. That would of course include Pakistan, Iran, India, the countries to the north, all of which, together with Afghan representatives among them, might be able to hammer out a development program that would be meaningful and cooperate in implementing it, shifting the focus of activities from killing to reconstructing and building. But the core of issues are going to have to be settled internal to Afghanistan.
Mohammad Hussein: It has been announced that the foreign forces would leave Afghanistan by 2014, and transfer responsibility for security to Afghans. However, what we have before us appears to be a very deceitful, corrupt situation of the U.S. government signing a Strategic Partnership agreement with the Afghan government to place permanent joint military bases in Afghanistan beyond 2024. It feels as if, to the Afghan Youth Peace Volunteers, that the withdrawal by 2014 is therefore inconsequential in light of the larger long term plans to keep forces in Afghanistan. Could you comment on this?
Noam Chomsky: I’m quite sure that those expectations are correct. There is very little doubt that the U.S. government intends to maintain effective military control over Afghanistan by one means or another, either through a client state with military bases, and support for what they’ll call Afghan troops. That’s the pattern elsewhere as well. So, for example, after bombing Serbia in 1999, the United States maintains a huge military base in Kosovo, which was the goal of the bombing. In Iraq, they’re still building military bases even though there is rhetoric about leaving the country. And I presume they will do the same in Afghanistan too, which is regarded by the U.S. as of strategic significance in the long term, within the plans of maintaining control of essentially the energy resources and other resources of the region, including western and Central Asia. So this is a piece of ongoing plans which in fact go back to the Second World War.
Right now, the United States is militarily engaged in one form or another in almost a hundred countries, including bases, special forces operations, support for domestic military and security forces. This is a global program of world militarization, essentially tracing back to headquarters in Washington, and Afghanistan is a part of it. It will be up to Afghans to see if, first of all, if they want this; secondly, if they can act in ways which will exclude it. That’s pretty much what’s happening in Iraq. As late as early 2008, the United States was officially insisting that it maintain military bases and be able to carry out combat operations in Iraq, and that the Iraqi government must privilege U.S. investors for the oil and energy system. Well, Iraqi resistance has compelled the United States to withdraw somewhat from that, substantially, in fact. But the efforts will still continue. These are ongoing conflicts based on long standing principles. Any real success in moving towards demilitarization and reconstruction of relations will have to require primarily the commitment of Afghans, but, as well, the cooperative efforts of popular groups of the Western powers to pressure their own governments.
Faiz: After three decades of war and being at the raw end of regional and global military interference in Afghanistan, the people are feeling lost and without hope. People are even losing hope and not confident that the United Nations, whose charter is to remove the scourge of war from all generations, would be able to offer an alternative solution. We have talked with peace groups about the possibility of a blue ribbon or blue scarf team of individuals, perhaps including Nobel Laureates, who could speak out and make a statement about the dire humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, and perhaps throw open a debate to the world about alternatives for ordinary Afghans who are losing all hope. Do you think that there is any possibility of the United Nations stepping in to offer a different narrative in these dire straits? And is there any possibility of an independent peacemaking blue ribbon team of peace builders who can offer a way out?
Noam Chomsky: One has to bear in mind that the United Nations cannot act independently. It can only act as far as the great powers will permit—that means primarily the United States, also Britain, and France, essentially, the Permanent Members of the Security Council—which limit what the United Nations can do. It can act within the constraints that they impose, and the United States is by far the most influential.
So, just to give one indication of that, take a look at the record of vetoes at the Security Council. In the early days of the United Nations, beginning in the late 1940s, U.S. power was so overwhelming in the world that the United Nations was basically an instrument of the United States. As other industrial powers recovered from the war and decolonization began, the United Nations became somewhat more representative of the people of the world. It became less controlled by the United States and the U.S. began vetoing resolutions. The first U.S. veto was in 1965, and since then, the United States is far in the lead vetoing Security Council resolutions, which blocks action. Now, Britain is second, and no one else is even close. And that continues now. There will probably be another U.S. veto next week. That’s in general the case. If the United States refuses to allow something to happen, the United Nations can’t do anything. Other great powers have also some influence, but less. So, the real question is, will the United States and Britain agree to permit actions of the kind that are outlined in the question. And I think that can come about, but again, we’re back to where we were before.
Abdulai: On behalf of the Afghan youth in Bamiyan, as well as those listening in from Kabul, we thank you for your time with us. We wish you well, and the best of health.
Noam Chomsky: Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to talk to you briefly. It’s a real privilege, and I greatly admire the wonderful work that you’re doing.
This article was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.
The Indydependant
Friday, December 16, 2011
No Woman No Country
Afghan women want peace, but not at the cost of losing all they have gained in the last 10 years. Yes, they believe in peace, but their rights are non-negotiable. During this transition process, Afghan Women want to emphasize security issues for the military and police but, primarily, for civil society. As executive director of a nonprofit, my trip to Afghanistan in 2005 was to coordinate the Ministry of Education's mandate to locate and select schools in the Waras region, an area with the greatest need. I had no idea what to expect, only that Waras was a day's drive southwest from Kabul in the opposite direction from the historical Bamiyan city district, where there is a proliferation of NGOs giving aid. Little did I know that this would turn into six days, and the majority of that time spent on horseback traversing a dozen shale-covered passes of the Surb Koh mountains that surrounds these villages....Continue Reading....
Pakistan’s rampant sectarian violence
A horrific video has been surfaced on Jihadi forums purportedly showing murdering of ethnic Hazara Shias in Mastung area of Pakistan’s Balochistan province. The victims were shown being dragged down from a passenger bus by a group of masked armed militants who latterly forced them to sit in a row. The assailants then opened indiscriminate firing on them, killing all of them on the spot. A jihadi tarana (Jihadi motivational song) can be heard in the back ground.
The incident originally took place nearly three months ago when a bus of Hazara Shias pilgrims came under attack on September 20, killing 26 passengers, while carrying them for pilgrimage of Shia Muslims holiest places in Iran.
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a banned militant anti-Shia outfit, having deep links with Al-Qaeda and other regional Sunni militant organizations, latterly claimed responsibility for the attack in telephonic calls to local media outlets. The group with its lethal suicide squad is believed to be responsible for orchestrating numerous deadly attacks against Shias across Pakistan. The group was also accused by the Afghan authorities for the recent scarce twin attacks against minority Shias in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif on 10th of Muharram.
Sectarian violence has been bedeviling Pakistan since late 70s when two epic developments started taking place in the region; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Khomeini led radical Shia revolution in Iran. Since then, thousands of both Shias and Sunnis have lost their lives in Pakistan.
Situation got deteriorated when Iran and Saudi Arabia, settling scores with each other on ideological grounds, stared patronizing their respective ideological proxies. These groups were nurtured by both the countries in order to deter each other influence in Pakistan.
Quetta, provincial capital of Pakistan’s largest province Balochistan, has seen some worst incidents of sectarian violence in recent past. Hundreds of Hazaras, predominantly Shias, have been killed in series of bomb blasts and targeted killings in Quetta and its suburbs.
Dramatically, sectarian violence got escalated when Mushraf regime imposed a ban on militants sectarian organizations hailing both from Sunni and Shia school of thoughts in 2001 and then in 2002. The steps taken by the authorities to curb this menace seem futile so far.
Asian Correspondent
What does Pakistan want in Afghanistan?
By Najmuddin A Shaikh
Published: December 15, 2011
The writer was foreign secretary from 1994-97 and also served as Pakistan’s ambassador to Iran (1992-94) and the US (1990-91)
People in Pakistan realise that the country needs to keep its relations with the United States, its western allies and its Arab friends in the Gulf on an even keel, because these countries are the markets for our meagre exports, and the source of the remittances which, along with aid from these countries, is what keeps our fragile economy afloat. What is not equally well realised is that in Afghanistan, particularly at this time, we have convergent and not divergent interests. America wants to have a modicum of stability in that country as it prepares to withdraw its troops. Perhaps its proposed agreement with Afghanistan for a troop presence for a decade after 2014 has some sinister purpose but for the moment it seems that if reconciliation and then stability come to Afghanistan earlier the Americans will withdraw before the decade is out.
Pakistan, too, needs that stability to be able to send the Afghans – refugees and insurgents – now in Pakistan back to their country and to reassert state control on the territories that the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban have occupied. They are by my reckoning at least 5 million on our soil- 1.7 million registered, an equal number unregistered and another 1.5 million who have fraudulently acquired Pakistani documents.
Pakistan needs that stability to be able to gain the economic dividends of its geo-strategic location by acting as the transit route for South Asia’s trade with Central and West Asia, and to utilise the expensively constructed Gwadar Port. On this stability depends TAPI — the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan bringing sorely needed energy to Pakistan — which will yiled substantial transit revenues as it moves to India and CASA 1000 project, the high-voltage transmission line carrying Tajik and Kyrgyz hydel-power which would ease our power shortage. Afghanistan itself has the potential to generate exports. Despite the problems it is having, Afghanistan has been able to secure Chinese investment for the Aynak Copper mine and Indian investment for exploiting the Hajigak iron ore deposits. For the product of both these projects and for the many others that will come on stream as the world seeks to take advantage of the $1 trillion worth of minerals that are said to exist in Afghanistan, the logical route for getting them to market is through Pakistan’s Gwadar port. If South and East Afghanistan remain disturbed other routes will be seen as more attractive.
Pakistan needs that stability to be able to check the rampant smuggling and the misuse of the Afghan Transit trade facility that, by my estimate, brings more than $5 billion worth of smuggled goods and 33 per cent of Afghanistan’s opium production into Pakistan. The scandal of the missing containers, now detected by the Ombudsman, is indicative of the extent to which the current instability in Afghanistan has undermined our economy. We have consistently ignored the impact of the opium trade, perhaps, complacent in the belief that all the opium or heroin that enters our borders is sent on to Europe or other destinations. The sad truth that other transit countries, notably Iran, have discovered that a substantial part of such narcotics end up being consumed in the transit country, destroy the youth of the country.
These are our economic benefits. On the security front the 350,000-strong national security apparatus that the Americans hope to have in place by the end of 2012 would, if maintained at that level, be the realisation of our security establishment’s worst nightmare. Such a force, drawn largely from the ethnic minorities —the Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks — whom we regard as our adversaries, would be an ideal tool for ‘encirclement’. This force will, to justify its continued existence, have to find a cause and that could be the undoing of the Durand Line as the border with Pakistan. To survive, it will need external financing and, as and when American aid ceases, as it must, this force, which will become a dominant political force in Afghanistan, will look to regional allies to make up the deficiency. The impact of such development on our security calculus is clear. Stability will enable us to discuss with the Afghans the folly of trying to maintain the monster-size security forces and help the Afghan administration, be it led by Hamid Karzai or another elected leader, to cut this number down to the ethnically balanced 25-30,000-strong force that the Afghan economy will need and can support.
Should these clear advantages be seen as less important than the feared bogies that have led us towards skewed policies? My next article will deal with what I believe we need to do to achieve stability in Afghanistan and by extension in Pakistan.
Note: This article has been revised. The original version appeared in the print edition.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 16th, 2011.
Published: December 15, 2011
People in Pakistan realise that the country needs to keep its relations with the United States, its western allies and its Arab friends in the Gulf on an even keel, because these countries are the markets for our meagre exports, and the source of the remittances which, along with aid from these countries, is what keeps our fragile economy afloat. What is not equally well realised is that in Afghanistan, particularly at this time, we have convergent and not divergent interests. America wants to have a modicum of stability in that country as it prepares to withdraw its troops. Perhaps its proposed agreement with Afghanistan for a troop presence for a decade after 2014 has some sinister purpose but for the moment it seems that if reconciliation and then stability come to Afghanistan earlier the Americans will withdraw before the decade is out.
Pakistan, too, needs that stability to be able to send the Afghans – refugees and insurgents – now in Pakistan back to their country and to reassert state control on the territories that the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban have occupied. They are by my reckoning at least 5 million on our soil- 1.7 million registered, an equal number unregistered and another 1.5 million who have fraudulently acquired Pakistani documents.
Pakistan needs that stability to be able to gain the economic dividends of its geo-strategic location by acting as the transit route for South Asia’s trade with Central and West Asia, and to utilise the expensively constructed Gwadar Port. On this stability depends TAPI — the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan bringing sorely needed energy to Pakistan — which will yiled substantial transit revenues as it moves to India and CASA 1000 project, the high-voltage transmission line carrying Tajik and Kyrgyz hydel-power which would ease our power shortage. Afghanistan itself has the potential to generate exports. Despite the problems it is having, Afghanistan has been able to secure Chinese investment for the Aynak Copper mine and Indian investment for exploiting the Hajigak iron ore deposits. For the product of both these projects and for the many others that will come on stream as the world seeks to take advantage of the $1 trillion worth of minerals that are said to exist in Afghanistan, the logical route for getting them to market is through Pakistan’s Gwadar port. If South and East Afghanistan remain disturbed other routes will be seen as more attractive.
Pakistan needs that stability to be able to check the rampant smuggling and the misuse of the Afghan Transit trade facility that, by my estimate, brings more than $5 billion worth of smuggled goods and 33 per cent of Afghanistan’s opium production into Pakistan. The scandal of the missing containers, now detected by the Ombudsman, is indicative of the extent to which the current instability in Afghanistan has undermined our economy. We have consistently ignored the impact of the opium trade, perhaps, complacent in the belief that all the opium or heroin that enters our borders is sent on to Europe or other destinations. The sad truth that other transit countries, notably Iran, have discovered that a substantial part of such narcotics end up being consumed in the transit country, destroy the youth of the country.
These are our economic benefits. On the security front the 350,000-strong national security apparatus that the Americans hope to have in place by the end of 2012 would, if maintained at that level, be the realisation of our security establishment’s worst nightmare. Such a force, drawn largely from the ethnic minorities —the Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks — whom we regard as our adversaries, would be an ideal tool for ‘encirclement’. This force will, to justify its continued existence, have to find a cause and that could be the undoing of the Durand Line as the border with Pakistan. To survive, it will need external financing and, as and when American aid ceases, as it must, this force, which will become a dominant political force in Afghanistan, will look to regional allies to make up the deficiency. The impact of such development on our security calculus is clear. Stability will enable us to discuss with the Afghans the folly of trying to maintain the monster-size security forces and help the Afghan administration, be it led by Hamid Karzai or another elected leader, to cut this number down to the ethnically balanced 25-30,000-strong force that the Afghan economy will need and can support.
Should these clear advantages be seen as less important than the feared bogies that have led us towards skewed policies? My next article will deal with what I believe we need to do to achieve stability in Afghanistan and by extension in Pakistan.
Note: This article has been revised. The original version appeared in the print edition.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 16th, 2011.
Thursday, December 15, 2011
Amidst War, An Afghan Renaissance
We often see the arts as only fit for museums, galleries, and film festivals, cloistered in halls only for the intellectual elite. But the arts can help build a nation, or in the case of Afghanistan, are rebuilding a nation, employing its people, and recalling a history forgotten in recent decades of continuous conflict. And a small group of social scientists, architects, and entrepreneurs are using culture as a vehicle to restore Afghanistan, challenging the convention that the arts are only for aesthetics...Continue Reading......
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)