2012-01-25 21:21:04
by Abdul Haleem, Yangtze Yan
KABUL, Jan. 25 (Xinhua) -- The continued snowfall over the past days has worsened the traffic chaos, especially in the Afghan capital of Kabul.
"You can see the long queue of people who have been waiting for one hour for a bus to go home but no bus is available," Mohammad Arif, a Kabul resident, told Xinhua on Tuesday evening, pointing to the flocks of people waiting at a bus stop in downtown Kabul.
Standing and shaking in the freezing weather, the 40-year-old Arif shouted in anger and despair that "no bus is ever coming to take people."
But when a minibus did arrive, Arif still didn't succeed in grabbing a seat in the fight with a group of equally desperate home goers.
Over the past two weeks, the major parts of Afghanistan including the capital city have experienced heavy snowfall. More than 40 people have lost their lives in avalanches and cold spell in the northeastern Badakhshan province, according to officials, while some roads leading to central Daikundi's provincial capital Nili have been blocked due to snow.
"I have been waiting for more than one hour but no bus, taxi or private car is available," said another Kabul resident Haroon, 35.
The temperature had dived to minus 13 degrees centigrade, forcing many drivers to stay at home to avoid accidents on the icy and congested roads.
Normally, few public buses are roaming in Kabul with over 4 million residents. There is no subway in the capital city to transport commuters.
However, some 400,000 vehicles, mostly private cars, are driven on the bumpy roads in Kabul, with a considerable number of private cars working as taxi.
The private car owners prefer to stay at home though they are more needed in heavy snowfall and freezing weather.
"I do not want to make accident and plunge myself into trouble, " Mohammed Sediq, a driver of a private corolla, told Xinhua, adding that driving in slippery streets is risky.
English.news.cn
Wednesday, February 8, 2012
The banned outfit
Rafia Zakaria | Opinion | From the Newspaper
IT has been a decade of bans and lists. As the world of terror revealed itself to be more and more amorphous, nation states have fought back collecting the names, identifying the leaders and eliminating the followers of terror groups.
There are lists of banned organisations in Pakistan and lists of people not permitted in America. Along with lists there are typologies and profiles; the richer the nation, the more detailed the conjured portraits of terror.
In one of the latest episodes revolving around terror and terrorists, Malik Ishaq, leader of the banned Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, was recently released from detention from Kot Lakhpat jail.
A few days later, he attended a rally in Multan organised by the Difa-i-Pakistan Council, seen as a new motley coalition of groups such as the Jamaat-i-Islami, Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (formerly known as Sipah-i-Sahaba), Maulana Samiul Haq’s faction of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam and others.
Malik Ishaq was not the only freed terrorist present at the rally. Also in attendance was Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, head of the Jamaatud Dawa. Under the new rhetorical flourish of ‘defending Pakistan’ each emerged in public, untouched by previous sins committed under old names.
The massacre of Shia Hazaras in Mastung and the horrific attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team that left this country humiliated all seemed to be forgotten in view of the latest indignities imposed by the United States, the desecration of Muslim corpses by ‘infidel’ soldiers and the absolving magic of a new patriotic name.
The name game — the coining of new names as one agenda for hatred morphs into another — and the painstaking tracing of genealogies of terror by American experts has become such a well-oiled cycle that both ends follow practised sequences enacted with well-rehearsed outrage.
As per this worn script, two days after the rally the US ambassador to Pakistan reportedly warned that aid disbursements to Pakistan would be ceased unless action was taken against the two individuals.
Also as per the stage instructions, Pakistani heads nodded and made responsive motions, yet the curtain fell on January with no conclusions and no catharsis.
Adequate room was left by all involved for sequels that capitalise on the same plotlines with mildly altered angles and slight variations of dialogue. There are many critiques of course: everything written on either side of this issue; the inadequate denunciation and pursuit of terror on one end, the imperialist overreach and illegality of secret wars and surreptitious killings on the other.
Neither is able or willing to see the new pathology spawned by the entrenchment of these roles. Pakistanis and Americans as well as their respective governments are unable to see terror except in the limited shades of this scripted tragedy.
The challenges of labelling terror as endemic and the terrorist as a criminal, his pursuit and apprehension as an act of law enforcement rather than war-mongering at the American end rest on two issues.
First is the fact that the American criminal justice system rests on the precept of innocence until guilt has been established in a court of law and robust scepticism towards pre-emptive punishment even in situations where individuals pose a significant risk of future criminal activity.
Because the core of the ongoing war on terror is largely pre-emptive, there is resistance to the prosecution of alleged terrorists in American criminal courts or as the passage of the National Defence Authorisation Act reveals, the creation of a parallel system that permits acts such as indefinite detention that would otherwise be deemed unconstitutional.
The second factor has been the United States’ long-standing reticence to join the International Criminal Court, established in 2002 through the Rome Statute to prosecute war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The first creates a perception of terror as something finite, existing in particular times and contexts and with a distinct end. The second leaves a vast gap in the transnational legal tools available to prosecute crimes beyond national jurisdictions.
Cumulatively, both leave the issue of terror to foreign policy experts and military strategists, both of whom conceptualise the elimination of terror and the terrorist as a linear task with finite parameters accomplished via bombs and targeted killings.
On the Pakistani end, there is the inability to conceptualise terrorism as a moral issue with dimensions beyond imperialism, nationalism and sovereignty.
As a result, people appear at rallies where known terrorist leaders are present; mobs collect and enact fatwas that punish religious minorities, and any failing to echo the populist rhetoric of denouncing America and railing against the West.
On the basis of this dynamic, the end of the war on terror and the withdrawal of the US and Nato forces is equivocated with the end of terror itself, possibly even the end of all scourges leaving a pristine Pakistan untrammelled by want or famine or disaster.
The beneficiaries of these delusions — American and Pakistani — are Hafiz Saeed and Malik Ishaq, who can discard their banned outfits for new fashions of populism, managing to dupe both those in Pakistan and those in America.
The former invest these chameleons with the bravado of facing down a bossy superpower; the latter believe that the terrorist is a product of ideology, demography, faith and a smattering of other variables.
Neither seems to understand that terror, like crime, is an ugly fact of life, the result of the failure of conscience and a detriment to all human beings. It will never go away, not with the exit of a superpower or the elimination of a terrorist leader.
Its denunciations must rest not on strategic calculations, the disbursement of aid, the passage of shipments, the counting of corpses and ruined lives and destroyed futures, its biggest casualty is our universal loss of faith in the possibility of justice.
The writer is an attorney teaching political philosophy and constitutional law.
rafia.zakaria@gmail.com
DAWN
IT has been a decade of bans and lists. As the world of terror revealed itself to be more and more amorphous, nation states have fought back collecting the names, identifying the leaders and eliminating the followers of terror groups.
There are lists of banned organisations in Pakistan and lists of people not permitted in America. Along with lists there are typologies and profiles; the richer the nation, the more detailed the conjured portraits of terror.
In one of the latest episodes revolving around terror and terrorists, Malik Ishaq, leader of the banned Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, was recently released from detention from Kot Lakhpat jail.
A few days later, he attended a rally in Multan organised by the Difa-i-Pakistan Council, seen as a new motley coalition of groups such as the Jamaat-i-Islami, Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (formerly known as Sipah-i-Sahaba), Maulana Samiul Haq’s faction of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam and others.
Malik Ishaq was not the only freed terrorist present at the rally. Also in attendance was Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, head of the Jamaatud Dawa. Under the new rhetorical flourish of ‘defending Pakistan’ each emerged in public, untouched by previous sins committed under old names.
The massacre of Shia Hazaras in Mastung and the horrific attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team that left this country humiliated all seemed to be forgotten in view of the latest indignities imposed by the United States, the desecration of Muslim corpses by ‘infidel’ soldiers and the absolving magic of a new patriotic name.
The name game — the coining of new names as one agenda for hatred morphs into another — and the painstaking tracing of genealogies of terror by American experts has become such a well-oiled cycle that both ends follow practised sequences enacted with well-rehearsed outrage.
As per this worn script, two days after the rally the US ambassador to Pakistan reportedly warned that aid disbursements to Pakistan would be ceased unless action was taken against the two individuals.
Also as per the stage instructions, Pakistani heads nodded and made responsive motions, yet the curtain fell on January with no conclusions and no catharsis.
Adequate room was left by all involved for sequels that capitalise on the same plotlines with mildly altered angles and slight variations of dialogue. There are many critiques of course: everything written on either side of this issue; the inadequate denunciation and pursuit of terror on one end, the imperialist overreach and illegality of secret wars and surreptitious killings on the other.
Neither is able or willing to see the new pathology spawned by the entrenchment of these roles. Pakistanis and Americans as well as their respective governments are unable to see terror except in the limited shades of this scripted tragedy.
The challenges of labelling terror as endemic and the terrorist as a criminal, his pursuit and apprehension as an act of law enforcement rather than war-mongering at the American end rest on two issues.
First is the fact that the American criminal justice system rests on the precept of innocence until guilt has been established in a court of law and robust scepticism towards pre-emptive punishment even in situations where individuals pose a significant risk of future criminal activity.
Because the core of the ongoing war on terror is largely pre-emptive, there is resistance to the prosecution of alleged terrorists in American criminal courts or as the passage of the National Defence Authorisation Act reveals, the creation of a parallel system that permits acts such as indefinite detention that would otherwise be deemed unconstitutional.
The second factor has been the United States’ long-standing reticence to join the International Criminal Court, established in 2002 through the Rome Statute to prosecute war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The first creates a perception of terror as something finite, existing in particular times and contexts and with a distinct end. The second leaves a vast gap in the transnational legal tools available to prosecute crimes beyond national jurisdictions.
Cumulatively, both leave the issue of terror to foreign policy experts and military strategists, both of whom conceptualise the elimination of terror and the terrorist as a linear task with finite parameters accomplished via bombs and targeted killings.
On the Pakistani end, there is the inability to conceptualise terrorism as a moral issue with dimensions beyond imperialism, nationalism and sovereignty.
As a result, people appear at rallies where known terrorist leaders are present; mobs collect and enact fatwas that punish religious minorities, and any failing to echo the populist rhetoric of denouncing America and railing against the West.
On the basis of this dynamic, the end of the war on terror and the withdrawal of the US and Nato forces is equivocated with the end of terror itself, possibly even the end of all scourges leaving a pristine Pakistan untrammelled by want or famine or disaster.
The beneficiaries of these delusions — American and Pakistani — are Hafiz Saeed and Malik Ishaq, who can discard their banned outfits for new fashions of populism, managing to dupe both those in Pakistan and those in America.
The former invest these chameleons with the bravado of facing down a bossy superpower; the latter believe that the terrorist is a product of ideology, demography, faith and a smattering of other variables.
Neither seems to understand that terror, like crime, is an ugly fact of life, the result of the failure of conscience and a detriment to all human beings. It will never go away, not with the exit of a superpower or the elimination of a terrorist leader.
Its denunciations must rest not on strategic calculations, the disbursement of aid, the passage of shipments, the counting of corpses and ruined lives and destroyed futures, its biggest casualty is our universal loss of faith in the possibility of justice.
The writer is an attorney teaching political philosophy and constitutional law.
rafia.zakaria@gmail.com
DAWN
Asian Human Rights Commission; PAKISTAN: Brutal sectarian violence against Shias continues unabated
February 8, 2012
It is a recognized fact that a state's police and law enforcement agencies play a critical role as the first line of defense against the threats of terrorism and insurgencies.
Police is often failing to protect the members of religious minorities including Ahmadias, Shias, Christians and Hindus. Militant groups are carrying out suicide bombings and targeted killings across the country. The Taliban and affiliated groups are increasingly targeting civilians and public spaces, including marketplaces, hospitals, and religious processions.
Although Shias are a minority in the country, Pakistan holds the second largest Shia community after Iran in terms of numbers. The total Shia population in Pakistan is approximately 50 million and may be as high as 60 million. Globally, Shia Islam represents 10-20% of the total Muslims population, while the remaining 90% or nine-tenths practice Sunni Islam.
The increase in the number of suicide bombings and militancy has added to the sectarian tension that is played out in Muharram (the month of mourning for the martyrdom of the grandson of the Prophet PBUH) every year. A series of bomb blasts and shootings, mostly targeting Pakistan's minority Shia community in recent years shows that sectarian violence in the country can be every bit as deadly as that instigated by al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Attacks in Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta and the north-west seem to be manifestations of the bitter split between Sunnis and Shias. In most cases, no-one claims responsibility for such attacks.
But Pakistan's fateful involvement in the Afghan-Soviet war of the 1980s, General Zia-ul-Haq's controversial 'Islamisation' policies, and a sense of Shia empowerment in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 had the combined effect of limiting the freedom of the Shia's to practice their religion and challenging their loyalty to Pakistan.
Among those blamed for the sectarian violence in the country are mainly Sunni militants such as Sipah-e-Sahaba and members of Shia militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Jafria and others. However, predominant Sunni terrorist groups are often blamed for frequent attacks on minority Shiites and their religious gatherings resulting in reprisal attacks by them.
Pakistan's ISI-backed Punjabi judiciary once again demonstrated its institutional hatred of Shia Muslims today by releasing the notorious leader of the Jihadi-sectarian organization Malik Ishaq, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (also known as the Punjabi Taliban or Sipah-e-Sahaba). Punjabi judges, backed by Punjabi generals, released a Punjabi terrorist to enable further massacres of Shias, Ahmadis, Christians and other targeted communities.
Malik Ishaq was released less than a week after his followers killed at least 20 Shia Muslims in his home town of Rahim Yar Khan. On the last occasion he was released from jail, he killed many Shia Muslims in various parts of the country, and the news items were either ignored or misrepresented in Pakistan's mainstream media. He has now embarked on his next bloody mission.
While right-wing proxies of Pakistan's military establishment are legitimately celebrating Malik Ishaq's release, the ISI's liberal proxies in the English speaking class are busy in blaming the prosecution, ignoring the important links between ISI and LeJ and ISI and the judiciary. For example, Pakistan's English media routinely presents Malik Ishaq as the "Sri Lankan team attack suspect". Therefore, the murder of 70 Shias does not mean much to this class. Reference http://criticalppp.com/archives/69517
Over the past three decades, violence between Sunnis and Shias has ebbed and flowed, but two things are clear. First, despite spawning banned violent sectarian outfits of their own, the Shias have largely been on the receiving end of the violence. In recent years, the violence has spread from southern Punjab and (sporadically) Karachi to Quetta in Balochistan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas on Pakistan's troubled border with Afghanistan.
Hundreds of Shias have been murdered by militants in Quetta in the past few months. In the last couple of weeks, Shias have been taken off buses, lined up and shot dead. Quetta, however, is not an exception. Shias are not safe in any major town in Pakistan. Their places of worship, religious processions, and civilian and religious leadership has come under relentless attacks while the State's machinery has either refused or failed to protect Shias and other religious minorities in Pakistan.
The organized systematic genocide of Shiite Muslims in Pakistan has claimed 58 lives and injured 67 during the month of January 2012 in 32 attacks.
Based on January 2012 statistics, the projected number of deaths per year could be somewhere in the vicinity of 500 to 800 Shia Muslims killed per year and the number of those injured could be estimated to be between 700 and 1000.
In terms of the total number of attacks in January 2012, Sindh, Karachi in particular, was most problematic (15 attacks out of total 32), however, in terms of total deaths, Punjab proved to be most deadly province (36 out of 58 deaths).
The list of recent sectarian attacks makes for grim reading:
September 2011: Gunmen open fire on a bus carry pilgrims at Mastung in Balochistan province. At least 26 Shia Muslims are killed
January 2011: At least 10 people killed after twin blasts targeted Shia Muslim processions in Lahore and Karachi.
September 2010:At least 35 Shias were killed and 160 people were injured in a blast during a procession in Lahore.
September 2010: At least 50 people killed in a suicide bombing at a Shia rally in Quetta, south-western Pakistan
July 2010: Sixteen Shias killed in an attack on Shias in north-western tribal areas
February 2010: Two bombs in Karachi kill at least 25 Shias and injured more than 50 people.
December 2009: At least 40 people killed and dozens injured in a suicide bombing on a Shia procession in Karachi
Feb 2009: Bomb attack on a Shia procession in Punjab leaves 35 dead
It is a sad fact that the scores of deaths in the last few months is particularly alarming all over Pakistan. Due to paucity of resources and lack of communication networks there are still incidents of Jihadi sectarian attacks on Shia Muslims which are not recorded. This means that no exact statistics is available about Shia killings in Parachinar and other areas in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA).
The Punjab government for having a soft spot for terrorist outfits, especially The Jamat- ud- Dawah (JUD) and Lashkar - e- Jhangvi (LEJ). Granted that the Punjab government must be held accountable for allowing these organisations and other extremist groups to hold public rallies full of hate speech all over Punjab.
The Pakistani government claims that it has taken measures to suppress the violence. The Pakistani Interior Chief Rehman Malik said the Shia population was in need of greater protection. Therefore, Islamabad ordered security forces to carry out this task, yet the violence has continued.
Our voices should no longer remain muted. We must convince the Pakistani government and its affiliates that it is crucial to take greater action against the violence perpetrated by these terrorists.
Officials must target the sources and support for the sectarian violence by apprehending known leaders and members of Taliban-associated militant groups across the country. Their influence has reached major cities as well and must be stopped.
Saudi-funded madressas (Islamic schools), which are used to target impressionable children and youth and preach the mentality that Shias are infidels, should be closely regulated and, in some cases, shut down.
Document Type :Article
Document ID :AHRC-ART-008-2012
Countries : Pakistan
Issues : Freedom of religion
Asian Human Rights Commission
It is a recognized fact that a state's police and law enforcement agencies play a critical role as the first line of defense against the threats of terrorism and insurgencies.
Police is often failing to protect the members of religious minorities including Ahmadias, Shias, Christians and Hindus. Militant groups are carrying out suicide bombings and targeted killings across the country. The Taliban and affiliated groups are increasingly targeting civilians and public spaces, including marketplaces, hospitals, and religious processions.
Although Shias are a minority in the country, Pakistan holds the second largest Shia community after Iran in terms of numbers. The total Shia population in Pakistan is approximately 50 million and may be as high as 60 million. Globally, Shia Islam represents 10-20% of the total Muslims population, while the remaining 90% or nine-tenths practice Sunni Islam.
The increase in the number of suicide bombings and militancy has added to the sectarian tension that is played out in Muharram (the month of mourning for the martyrdom of the grandson of the Prophet PBUH) every year. A series of bomb blasts and shootings, mostly targeting Pakistan's minority Shia community in recent years shows that sectarian violence in the country can be every bit as deadly as that instigated by al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Attacks in Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta and the north-west seem to be manifestations of the bitter split between Sunnis and Shias. In most cases, no-one claims responsibility for such attacks.
But Pakistan's fateful involvement in the Afghan-Soviet war of the 1980s, General Zia-ul-Haq's controversial 'Islamisation' policies, and a sense of Shia empowerment in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 had the combined effect of limiting the freedom of the Shia's to practice their religion and challenging their loyalty to Pakistan.
Among those blamed for the sectarian violence in the country are mainly Sunni militants such as Sipah-e-Sahaba and members of Shia militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Jafria and others. However, predominant Sunni terrorist groups are often blamed for frequent attacks on minority Shiites and their religious gatherings resulting in reprisal attacks by them.
Pakistan's ISI-backed Punjabi judiciary once again demonstrated its institutional hatred of Shia Muslims today by releasing the notorious leader of the Jihadi-sectarian organization Malik Ishaq, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (also known as the Punjabi Taliban or Sipah-e-Sahaba). Punjabi judges, backed by Punjabi generals, released a Punjabi terrorist to enable further massacres of Shias, Ahmadis, Christians and other targeted communities.
Malik Ishaq was released less than a week after his followers killed at least 20 Shia Muslims in his home town of Rahim Yar Khan. On the last occasion he was released from jail, he killed many Shia Muslims in various parts of the country, and the news items were either ignored or misrepresented in Pakistan's mainstream media. He has now embarked on his next bloody mission.
While right-wing proxies of Pakistan's military establishment are legitimately celebrating Malik Ishaq's release, the ISI's liberal proxies in the English speaking class are busy in blaming the prosecution, ignoring the important links between ISI and LeJ and ISI and the judiciary. For example, Pakistan's English media routinely presents Malik Ishaq as the "Sri Lankan team attack suspect". Therefore, the murder of 70 Shias does not mean much to this class. Reference http://criticalppp.com/archives/69517
Over the past three decades, violence between Sunnis and Shias has ebbed and flowed, but two things are clear. First, despite spawning banned violent sectarian outfits of their own, the Shias have largely been on the receiving end of the violence. In recent years, the violence has spread from southern Punjab and (sporadically) Karachi to Quetta in Balochistan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas on Pakistan's troubled border with Afghanistan.
Hundreds of Shias have been murdered by militants in Quetta in the past few months. In the last couple of weeks, Shias have been taken off buses, lined up and shot dead. Quetta, however, is not an exception. Shias are not safe in any major town in Pakistan. Their places of worship, religious processions, and civilian and religious leadership has come under relentless attacks while the State's machinery has either refused or failed to protect Shias and other religious minorities in Pakistan.
The organized systematic genocide of Shiite Muslims in Pakistan has claimed 58 lives and injured 67 during the month of January 2012 in 32 attacks.
Based on January 2012 statistics, the projected number of deaths per year could be somewhere in the vicinity of 500 to 800 Shia Muslims killed per year and the number of those injured could be estimated to be between 700 and 1000.
In terms of the total number of attacks in January 2012, Sindh, Karachi in particular, was most problematic (15 attacks out of total 32), however, in terms of total deaths, Punjab proved to be most deadly province (36 out of 58 deaths).
The list of recent sectarian attacks makes for grim reading:
September 2011: Gunmen open fire on a bus carry pilgrims at Mastung in Balochistan province. At least 26 Shia Muslims are killed
January 2011: At least 10 people killed after twin blasts targeted Shia Muslim processions in Lahore and Karachi.
September 2010:At least 35 Shias were killed and 160 people were injured in a blast during a procession in Lahore.
September 2010: At least 50 people killed in a suicide bombing at a Shia rally in Quetta, south-western Pakistan
July 2010: Sixteen Shias killed in an attack on Shias in north-western tribal areas
February 2010: Two bombs in Karachi kill at least 25 Shias and injured more than 50 people.
December 2009: At least 40 people killed and dozens injured in a suicide bombing on a Shia procession in Karachi
Feb 2009: Bomb attack on a Shia procession in Punjab leaves 35 dead
It is a sad fact that the scores of deaths in the last few months is particularly alarming all over Pakistan. Due to paucity of resources and lack of communication networks there are still incidents of Jihadi sectarian attacks on Shia Muslims which are not recorded. This means that no exact statistics is available about Shia killings in Parachinar and other areas in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA).
The Punjab government for having a soft spot for terrorist outfits, especially The Jamat- ud- Dawah (JUD) and Lashkar - e- Jhangvi (LEJ). Granted that the Punjab government must be held accountable for allowing these organisations and other extremist groups to hold public rallies full of hate speech all over Punjab.
The Pakistani government claims that it has taken measures to suppress the violence. The Pakistani Interior Chief Rehman Malik said the Shia population was in need of greater protection. Therefore, Islamabad ordered security forces to carry out this task, yet the violence has continued.
Our voices should no longer remain muted. We must convince the Pakistani government and its affiliates that it is crucial to take greater action against the violence perpetrated by these terrorists.
Officials must target the sources and support for the sectarian violence by apprehending known leaders and members of Taliban-associated militant groups across the country. Their influence has reached major cities as well and must be stopped.
Saudi-funded madressas (Islamic schools), which are used to target impressionable children and youth and preach the mentality that Shias are infidels, should be closely regulated and, in some cases, shut down.
Document Type :Article
Document ID :AHRC-ART-008-2012
Countries : Pakistan
Issues : Freedom of religion
Asian Human Rights Commission
Couple die of gas suffocation in Quetta
QUETTA: A couple died of suffocation in Hazara Town area of the provincial capital on Tuesday. According to official sources, a couple identified as Owais Ahmed and his wife Fatima Bibi forgot to switch off their gas heater before going to sleep. Resultantly, gas filled the entire room, causing the couple to fall unconscious. They were shifted the Civil Hospital where they were Their bodies were handed over to their relatives for burial after legal formalities. staff report
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