The sectarian menace

From the Newspaper | Tariq Khosa

IN the wake of the attacks against the Hazaras in Quetta, accusations have been levelled by a section of civil society, media and human rights organisations that the armed forces and its intelligence agencies have some links with proscribed militant outfits like the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ).

There is also a widespread general perception that our security establishment calls the shots on internal security issues, especially those pertaining to Balochistan and Fata.

This criticism against a publicly respected institution of the armed forces resulted in an emphatic denial by none other than the chief of the ISPR, the military’s media wing, at a specially arranged media briefing last month.

At the same time the secretive and powerful ISI formally told the Supreme Court that it had conveyed prior information about the transfer of large-scale chemicals from Lahore for preparation of explosives in Quetta to be soon used against the Hazaras.

It conceded that formal counterterrorism operations were not part of the ISI’s mandate, implying that the Frontier Corps (FC) and the police had failed to prevent the carnage even after being given clear information.

A military spokesman stated clearly that “the armed forces were not in contact with any militant organisation, including the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi”. This realisation is welcome, especially after a change in the military doctrine recently when the army chief unequivocally declared on Independence Day in 2012 that the Pakistani state was pitted against an internal enemy in the form of militant organisations that were planning to unravel the country through terrorism and religious extremism.

The very public and categorical denial by the army command should also result in the institution’s own soul-searching and internal accountability about the patronage of certain militant organisations by the military and the intelligence agencies, especially during the Zia and Musharraf eras.

The present army command knows and understands that security-handling and political engineering by the Military Intelligence (MI) in Balochistan led to the woes of that unfortunate province that continues to bleed due to the unresolved issue of the missing persons, the Baloch insurgency, targeted killings of Punjabi settlers and sectarian terrorism, especially against the Hazara Shias.

While ruling out any collaboration at any level, the army spokesman stated that there was “no reason to think about the army’s involvement” with the LJ. He vociferously added that “there is no way the army can afford this. If such a thing comes to notice it will be sorted out”.

The record shows and all Hazaras know that there was not a single incident of sectarian terrorism in Quetta or the entire province in 2007 because high-profile LJ terrorists like Usman Kurd and Dawood Badini had been apprehended and incarcerated in a high-security, anti-terrorism police force-guarded prison in the
military cantonment in Quetta.

Will the army command and intelligence agencies honestly probe the circumstances under which the LJ desperados escaped from a secure facility in January 2008? Is it not a fact that the LJ Balochistan regrouped under these fugitives and since then has unleashed a reign of terror, not only in Quetta but all over the country?

In my view, the armed forces now have a responsibility to come up to the expectations of the victim Shia community of Quetta and leave no stone unturned to re-arrest the LJ fugitives.

No army operation is required for this challenging task. All it requires is for the Crime Investigation Department, the Special Branch, Intelligence Bureau, and the ISI to pool their resources, share information and help the police, FC and the armed forces for a targeted raid in an area which is outside the jurisdiction of the police.

It is now time to address the civil-military disconnect to resolve the issue of internal security fault lines and stop blaming each other. Sectarian violence is now the biggest threat to our national cohesion and peace.

The timing is also crucial because the next national elections are around the corner.

An inept and corrupt government failed to muster the political will to tackle the security challenges facing Balochistan during the last five years.

A truly representative new political leadership elected as a result of fair and transparent elections will hopefully be chastened by the previous misrule and try to deliver peace and progress to the hapless citizens of a province crying for the healing touch of reforms.

Meanwhile, our security establishment led by the armed forces and intelligence agencies, who have been part of the problem, has to become a very active part of the solution to combat sectarian terrorism, resolve the issue of missing persons, guard our vast frontiers, and actively support the police, Levies, and civil armed forces such as the FC and Coast Guard.

It must do so not only to protect our vital national assets in Balochistan but become part and parcel of good governance and service delivery for citizens of the hinterland of our nation. I wish it Godspeed.

The writer is former IG police, Balochistan.

DAWN

The Stream - Searching for protection

گفتگو با وحیده محقق، همسر رهبر حزب وحدت مردم افغانستان

دھرنے اور تبدیلی

Tuesday 26 February 2013

سہیل سانگی

بارہ جنوری 2013 کو کوئٹہ میں شیعہ ہزارہ برادری سے تعلق رکھنے والے مظاہرین اور ہلاک ہونے والے افراد کے لواحقین میتوں کے ساتھ احتجاجی دھرنے میں موجود ہیں — اے ایف پی تصویر

کیا دھرنے تبدیلی کا ذریعہ بن سکتے ہیں؟ 

سیاسی کارکنوں میں یہ بحث چل نکلی ہے کہ مسائل دھرنے سے ہی حل ہو سکتے ہیں یا یہ دھرنے کسی بڑی تبدیلی کا ذریعہ بن سکتے ہیں۔ گواحتجاج کی یہ شکل پرانی ہے مگرآج بھی موثر ہے۔ حالیہ کوئٹہ کی ہزارہ کمیونٹی اور علامہ طاہرالقادری کے دھرنوں نے اس میں نئی جان ڈال دی ہے۔

ہر طرح کا احتجاج دراصل سماج سے رجوع کرنے کا مظہر ہے۔ مظاہرہ تھوڑٰی دیر کا احتجاج ہے جس کے ذریعے متعلقہ حکام کو مطالبات سننے پر مجبور کیا جاتا ہے یا ان مطالبات کی طرف عام لوگوں کی توجہ دلائی جاتی ہے اور رائے عامہ بنائی جاتی ہے۔

ریلی اور جلوس موبائل احتجاج ہے۔ جس میں احتجاج کرنے والے اہم علاقوں کا گشت کرکے لوگوں کو اپنی اور اپنے مطالبات کی طرف توجہ دلاتے ہیں۔

دھرنے کی نوعیت ان دو سے مختلف ہے۔ اس کا بنیادی فلسفہ مطالبے پر اصرار کرنا ہے۔ یعنی یہ احتجاج کسی عمل کو روکنے یا عمل پر متعلقہ حکام کو مجبور کرنے کے لیے استعمال کیا جاتا ہے۔

مظاہرین کسی اہم جگہ پر دھرنا مار کر اس طرح بیٹھ جاتے کہ کوئی مخصوص عمل کو روک سکیں یا اس میں رکاوٹ بنیں۔ دھرنے میں عزم اور مالکی زیادہ ہوتی ہے کہ ہم تب تک بیٹھے ہیں جب تک مطالبات منظور نہیں ہوتے۔ پھر انہیں زبردستی اٹھایا نہیں جاتا یا گرفتار نہیں کیا جاتا۔

دھرنوں کی حالیہ لہر وال اسٹریٹ پر قبضے سے شروع ہوئی۔ اس کے بعد بڑا اور کامیاب تجربہ مصر کے التحریر اسکوائر کا ہے۔ جس نے مصری حکومت کا خاتمہ کیا۔ یہ الگ بات ہے کہ وہاں کی متحرک قوتوں کو اس کے نتیجے میں آنے والی تبدیلی کو برقرار رکھنا خاصا مسئلہ ہو رہا ہے۔

دھرنا دراصل راست قدم کی ایک شکل ہے، مگرعدم تشدد پر مبنی پرامن طور احتجاج ہے۔

عام طور پر دھرنے احتجاج کا کامیاب ترین نسخہ رہے ہیں۔ کیونکہ یہ پورے عمل میں رخنہ پیدا کرتے ہیں۔ پرامن رہتے ہوئے یہ کسی بھی علاقے کو بند کرنے کا موثرترین طریقہ ہے۔

احتجاج کرنے والے پرامن ہوتے ہیں ایسے میں حکومت طاقت کا استعمال کرتی ہے تو بھی مصیبت میں آجاتی ہے۔ کیونکہ لوگوں کی ہمدردیاں احتجاج کرنے والوں کے ساتھ ہو جاتی ہیں۔

دھرنے ہمیشہ سے سول نافرمانی تحریک کا حصہ رہے ہیں۔ امریکہ میں گزشتہ پچاس ساٹھ سال کے دوران احتجاج کے اس طریقے کے نتیجے میں شہری حقوق کا قانون منظور ہوا۔ اور اس کے بعد نسلی بنیاد پر عوامی مقامات پر علحدگی ختم ہوئی۔

آگے چل کر دھرنے نے گھیراؤ اور قبضے کی تحریک کوجنم دیا۔ یہ احتجاج کی شکل مزدوروں کی جدوجہد سے شروع ہوئی جو بہتر تنخواہوں سے لیکر سرمایہ داری نظام کے خاتمہ تک کا مطالبہ کر رہے تھے۔ مزدوردھرنا مار کر بیٹھ جاتے تھے اور کارخانہ چلنے نہیں دیتے تھے۔

بعد میں قبضے کی تحریک سیاسی مقاصد کے لیے استعمال ہونے لگی۔ 2010 میں لندن کے پارلیمنٹ اسکوائر میں جمہوریت کا گاؤں کے نام سے خیمہ بستی لگائی گئی۔ 2011ع میں وال اسٹریٹ پر قبضہ کی تحریک چلی۔ جو دنیا بھر میں چل رہی ہے۔ گزشتہ سال اسپین میں بھی دھرنوں کی تحریک چلی۔ اس کے بعد مصر میں انقلاب التحریر اسکوائر آیا۔

دنیا بھر کے مزدوروں کی طرح پاکستان میں بھی مزدور یونینز مطالبات منوانے کے لیے دھرنے دیتی رہی ہیں۔ سندھ ٹیننسی ایکٹ بھی دھرنے کے نتیجے میں منظور ہوا تھا۔ سندھ ہاری کمیٹی نے کامریڈ حیدربخش جتوئی کی قیادت میں سندھ اسمبلی کا گھیراؤ کیا تھا۔

زبردستی منظور کرایا گیا قانون اس وجہ سے برقرار رہا کیونکہ صوبے میں رائے عامہ اس کے حق میں تھی۔ مزید یہ بھی کہ ریاستی مشینری پر وڈیروں اور جاگیرداروں کا قبضہ تھا۔ اس لیے انہیں یقین تھا کہ وہ ہاریوں کے حق میں بنائے گئے اس قانون کو غیر موثر رکھیں گے اور عمل درآمد نہیں ہونے دیں گے۔ ایسا ہی ہوا۔ اس قانون کو منظور ہوئے آدھی صدی سے زائد عرصہ گزر چکا ہے مگر کبھی بھی اس پر عمل نہیں ہوا۔

پاکستان کی سیاست میں دھرنے کا تصور مولانا عبدالحمید بھاشانی نے ساٹھ کے عشرے کے آخر میں گھیراؤ جلاؤ کے نعرے سے کیا۔ بائیں بازو کے بعض گروپ بھی اس نعرے میں بہہ گئے۔

ساٹھ اور ستر کے عشرے میں پیپلز پارٹی کے دور حکومت میں بعض مزدوریونینز نے کارخانوں کا گھیراؤ کر مطالبات منوانے کی کوشش کی۔ جس کے نتیجے میں کراچی اور ملتان میں مزدوروں پر گولی چلائی گئی اور کچھ مزدورہلاک بھی ہوئے۔

اس تحریک کے بعض منفی نتائج بھی نکلے۔ سرمایہ داروں نے اس تحریک کو بھٹو کی قومیانے کی پالیسی کے ساتھ جوڑا اور ملک سے سرمایہ کو باہر لے گئے۔ مہم جوئی کی آڑ میں حکومت کو موقعہ ملا کہ وہ ملک میں مزدور تحریک کو کچل دے۔

ماضی قریب میں ہمارے ملک میں دھرنے کی سیاست لانگ مارچ کیساتھ آئی۔ نواز شریف کے دور حکومت میں کالاباغ ڈیم کی تعمیر کے خلاف بینظیر بھٹو نے سندھ پنجاب سرحد پر کموں شہید کے مقام پر اور ولی خان نے اٹک کے پل پر دھرنا دیا تھا۔ یہ دھرنے اگرچہ چند گھنٹوں کے لیے تھے مگر موثر ثابت ہوئے اور نواز شریف حکومت کو آئندہ چند ماہ میں جانا پڑا۔

حال ہی میں علامہ طاہرالقادری نے انتخابی قوانین اور نگراں حکومت کی تقرری کے طریقہ کار میں تبدیلی کے لیے وفاقی دارالحکومت اسلام آباد میں دھرنا دیا۔ یہ دھرنا ایک حد تک کامیاب رہا کہ حکومت کو ان کے ساتھ معاہدہ کرنا پڑا۔

انہی دنوں کوئٹہ میں ہزارہ کمیونٹی سے تعلق رکھنے والے 83 سے زائد افراد دہشتگردی کے ایک واقعہ میں ہلاک ہوئے۔ جس کے خلاف دھرنا دیا۔ حکومت کو ان کے مطالبات ماننے پڑے۔

فروری کے دوسرے ہفتے میں ہزارہ کمیونٹی کے ساتھ ایک اور واقعہ پیش آیا ہے۔ جس میں درجنوں افراد ہلاک ہوگئے۔ ان واقعات کو ہزارہ کمیونٹی –جس کا تعلق اہل تشیع فرقے سے ہے– نے کمیونٹی کی نسل کشی کے مترادف قرار دیا اور دو روز تک کوئٹہ میں دھرنے دیئے گئے۔

ملک بھر میں اہل تشیع نے کوئٹہ کے مظلوموں کے ساتھ یکجہتی دکھا کر عوامی طاقت کا مظاہرہ کیا۔ تمام شاہراہیں بلاک کردی گئیں۔ مظاہرین نے ملزمان کی گرفتاری تک لاشیں دفنانے سے انکار کردیا۔ گزشتہ ماہ ان کے مطالبے پر بلوچستان میں رئیسانی کی صوبائی حکومت ختم کر کے گورنر راج نافذ کردیا گیا تھا۔ اس مرتبہ ان کی لسٹ میں یہ مطالبہ بھی شامل تھا کہ کوئٹہ کا انتظام فوج کے حوالے کیا جائے۔

سندھ میں قوم پرست جماعتیں دھرنے دیتی رہی ہیں۔ مگر ان کے دھرنے موثر ثابت نہیں ہوئے۔ حال ہی میں قوم پرستوں نے متنازع بلدیاتی نظام کے خلاف حیدرآباد کے بائی پاس پر دھرنا دینے کی کوشش کی تھی، مگر پولیس نے ان سے بائی پاس خالی کرالیا۔ لیکن علامہ قادری کے دھرنے یا سندھ سمیت ملک بھر میں ہزارہ کیمونٹی کی حمایت میں لگنے والے دھرنوں کے خلاف پولیس یا رینجرز وغیرہ استعمال نہیں کی گئی۔

یہ معاملہ اس وجہ سے بھی حساس تھا کہ کوئٹہ میں درجنوں لوگوں کی ہلاکت ہو چکی تھی۔ اور وہ مظاہرین لاشیں رکھ کر احتجاج کر رہے تھے۔ عالمی برادری کے آواز اٹھانے کی وجہ سے معاملے کی حساسیت اور بھی بڑھ گئی تھی۔ یہ بھی کہ یہ ایک مذہبی فرقے کا معاملہ تھا جو سماج اور ریاست کے مختلف اداروں کے حصوں کو متاثر کر سکتا تھا۔

دھرنے کی اثرپذیری کی وجہ سے بعض سنجیدہ حلقوں میں یہ بحث چل رہی ہے کہ کیا دھرنوں کو سماجی تبدیلی یا انقلاب کے لیے استعمال کیا جا سکتا ہے؟

سوشل میڈیا پر بھی اس موضوع پر بحث چل رہی ہے۔ اس بحث کے اہم نکات کو ان الفاظ میں سمویا جا سکتا ہے۔

- عوام ہی طاقت کا سرچشمہ ہیں اگر صحیح نظریہ اور سچی قیادت کے تحت عوام سڑکوں پر آجائیں تو انقلاب آکر رہتا ہے۔

- اس طرح کے دھرنوں سے فرق پڑتا ہے۔

- تبدیلی شعور سے آتی ہے۔ ہمارے پاس آج بھی لوگوں کا مطالبہ ہے کہ فوجّ آئے اور آکر حالات کو ٹھیک کرے۔ جبکہ فوج نے کئی سال حکومت کی مگر کوئی فائدہ نہیں۔

- پہلے یہ دیکھنا پڑے گا کہ لوگوں کو کونسی تبدیلی چاہئے؟ لوگوں کو انفرادی مفادات سے آزاد کریں گے تب تبدیلی آئے گی۔

- ہم ایک گلی میں رہتے ہوئے بھی ساتھ نہیں تو انقلاب میں کیسے ساتھ ہونگے؟

- انقلاب لفظ کا اتنا غلط استعمال ہوا ہے کہ اب اس لفظ پر پابندی عائد کی جانی چاہئے۔

- دھرنے انقلابی یا سماجی تبدیلی نہیں لا سکتے۔ انقلاب کے لیے تحریک کی ضرورت ہے۔ سماجی تبدیلی یا انقلاب کے لیے نظریہ اور سوشل پلان چاہئے۔

- دھرنے سے شاید انقلاب لیا جا سکتا ہے مگر یہ تبدیلی برقرار کیسے رہے؟ ریاستی مشنری مزاحمت کرے گی۔ ریاستی مشنری پر قبضہ کرنا اور اسکو کنٹرول میں رکھنا اتنا آسان نہیں ہوتا۔ دنیا میں ناکام انقلابوں اور تجربوں کی کہانیاں یہی بتاتی ہیں۔

- یہ ایک جدوجہد کی شکل ہے جسے مسلسل کرتے رہنے سے فرق پڑ سکتا ہے۔

- عرب دنیا میں انقلاب کیوں ناکام ہوئے؟ یہ سب دھرنا سیاست کے ذریعے آئے تھے۔ اگر باضابطہ کوئی تنظیم ہوتی تو لوگوں کو بڑا فائدہ پہنچتا۔

دھرنے کے ذریعے شاید کوئی چھوٹا موٹا مطالبہ تو منوایا جاسکتا ہے لیکن ہر دھرنا کامیاب نہیں ہوتا۔ صرف وہی دھرنے کامیابی حاصل کر پاتے ہیں جن کی پشت پر کچھ دوسری طاقتیں بھی ہوں۔ اس کے ساتھ ساتھ دھرنے کے مطالبات عوام میں صرف مقبول ہی نہ ہوں بلکہ ان کے لیے شدت سے خواہش بھی موجود ہو۔

اگرکوئی سیاسی قوت یا کوئی پرکشش نعرہ عوام کو اتنا متحرک کر بھی دیتا ہے کہ وہ اقتدار پر قبضہ کر لے، تو یہ قبضہ وقتی ہوتا ہے۔ کیونکہ اس قبضے کو برقرار رکھنے کے لیے جس تنظیم کاری کی ضرورت ہوتی ہے وہ پاکستان جیسے ممالک میں ناپید ہے۔ ریاستی مشینری ابھی بھی اتنی طاقتور ہے کہ وہ ایسے کسی چیلنج کا مقابلہ کرسکے۔ فرینچ انقلاب سمیت دنیا کے ناکام انقلابوں کے تجربے اور کہانیاں اس کی واضح مثال ہیں اور ان سے بڑا سبق بھی ملتا ہے۔

بلاشبہ عوام میں بڑی طاقت ہے۔ لیکن یہ طاقت جب ہی سیسہ پلائی دیوار بنتی ہے جب تنظیم کاری اور بے لوث قیادت بھی 

وجود ہو۔

DAWN

VIEW : Hazaras, the children of a lesser god — I — Mehboob Qadir

Anywhere else in the world, the Hazaras could have been a powerhouse of industry, culture, education and great civic sense

Shias in Pakistan are a sizeable religious community that has lived among Sunni main mass in perfect harmony since centuries. One would not really know or bother to find out who was a Shia or a Sunni until Moharrum, the month of Shia mourning arrived. Shias would wear black clothes with a sense of grief and loss commemorating the great martyrdom of Imam Hussain and his companions at the hands of an absolute despot. It used to be over as the month ended, more or less and then normal business of life resumed in the neighbourhood. As Sunnis, we would respect and empathise with Shia mourners in many local but graceful ways. We would attend their majlis (a recitation of tragic events), consume post majlis food distributed and set up drinking water stalls en route the mourning processions. Similarly, for at least the ten days of the Ashur (end of the month) we would not play music, buy new clothing or any major new thing, hold any festive event like weddings etc and avoid wearing freshly tailored or showy bright clothes.

All this and much more was done voluntarily and not under any special instructions by any lofty Allama or a Shaikh-ul-Islam. We would be deferential to the Shia sentiments because we were taught it was decent, humane and expected. None hated or disliked anyone for the shade of his belief, particularly Islamic faith. There were many sub-sects and schools of fiqah that were subsisting together with the main ones without any difficulty. Ahmadis were very well adjusted and so were Ismailis and the like. Wahabis were a few and far between, and generally distanced from socially because of their unsettling kind of belief. Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis and a tiny number of Jews were respected for their sensibilities. It used to be such a wonderful sight to see local Sikh businessmen sitting side by side the fierce Afridi traders in the Torkham bazaars.

Most regrettably, perceptions have moved away from realities in case of Pakistan and that is our real and abiding loss. There were no fatwas for beheadings; no faith charged processions, and least of all, no sectarian or communal murders. The best and most well behaved student in my class in Loralai was a handsome Hindu boy, Ramesh, whom I understand rose to heights in the civil service of the country. During college days, my best friends and brighter students were mostly Ahmadi boys with whom a lifelong relationship remains. Their sense of duty, integrity and dependability was amazing.

Then came the notorious, and in the hindsight, catastrophic anti-Ahmadi riots of 1953 in Lahore particularly. These were orchestrated mainly by the Jamaat-e-Islami’s Maududi and the Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam‘s firebrand Deobandi mullahs. Ahraris were typically opposed to Pakistan like Maududi and hated Ahmadis. The army quickly and effectively put them down and sentenced these characters to death that was later commuted to a jail-term. Sorrowfully, more than 200 Ahmadis were killed and huge property gutted in that madness. As an evil consequence, all such bigoted religious elements began to band together first as opposition to the Ahmadis but eventually expanded to other shades of belief via their doctrinal gurus: the Wahabis. Shias were the natural next minority, as it irked the unforgiving breed of mullahs within the Sunni main mass, and who better than the Deobandis and their chief patrons and ideologues: the nettlesome Wahabis. This toxic lava began to simmer but was controllable till two demons of destruction swept down upon the region in general and Pakistan in particular. As if coordinated, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and almost simultaneously, Ayatullah Khomeini, descended upon Iran. This was the beginning of a mutually reinforcing and assured destruction of broad and beautiful balance of faith in Pakistan. The late General Ziaul Haq espoused the cause of Afghan resistance and repainted it as jihad under the twin persuasion of Saudis followed by the US. That stratagem also assured a flow of dollars and reinvigorating of his faltering regime against the rising popular opposition to his medieval style rule. On his beck and call was again the abrasive Deobandi-Wahabi combine, unfortunately. These wicked twains were to later bring Pakistan and its people to tremendous harm and grief. That is what happens when one feeds vipers like these in one’s backyard.

The Khominite takeover of Iran enthused Shias to their dream of Mahdavi world dominance while Soviet invasion helped Saudis realise their dream of universal jihad albeit not in their land but safely in Afghanistan-Pakistan. There could have been nothing more auspicious for them than having a tin-pot dictator ruling Pakistan and looking for some kind of legitimacy. In this lava crater of regional upheavals, the Hazaras of Afghanistan and Quetta were caught in a vice not of their making but thrown around them by the tragic twists and turns of history. Pakistan was already seething with sectarian divide. Ahmadis had been declared as non-Muslims by the late Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto under pressure from the religious lobby in 1973.Time was ripe for a Wahabit-Deobandi ascent in Pakistan, just as the petro dollars began to flow in while Zia was already teetering over the sectarian edge.

The Afghan war of freedom from Soviets and concomitant Khominite revolution in the neighbouring Iran helped to pitch Sunnis against Shias in strange ways. The Khominite zeal scared and startled the Sunni peninsular Arabs. The Soviet invasion provided Saudis a golden chance to play out their Wahabist fantasy of jihad against an atheist super power. Eventually, the two mutually repulsive fantasies pitched Shias against Sunnis in our region and the bolt actually fell upon the Shia Hazaras in Afghanistan, in Quetta and elsewhere inside Pakistan. In a short while we will see how, but before that a bit of historic perspective is in order.

Hazaras had been truly the proverbial children of a lesser God in our region. Anywhere else in the world, the Hazaras could have been a powerhouse of industry, culture, education and great civic sense. In other words, they are a potential engine of tremendous social uplift. They are descendents of Mongol warriors who were accompanied by their Eurasian households when Chengiz Khan laid siege to Bamyan in 1221.After its capture they settled down and proliferated. Their robust resistance to assimilation into Afghan melting pot of races has turned out to be their biggest but unintended fatal fault.

Babur, the Mughal emperor had noted Hazaras inhabiting Hazarajat west of Kabul as far as Ghor, Ghazni and Quetta in the 16th century. That was just about the time when under Safavid influence they converted to Shiism, a leap that unfolded dreadfully three centuries later. It was 1890 and the fierce Amir Abdur Rehman ruled over Afghanistan. The Hazaras decided to side with the king’s rebel cousin. They were routed.Their men were imprisoned; many were brutally executed and properties confiscated arbitrarily. The atrocities continued forcing the Hazaras to revolt again in 1892, and yet again in 1893. Amir’s retribution was swift, barbaric and bloody. Thousands of Hazara men, women and children were sold off as slaves in the markets of Kabul and Qandhar.

Amir Abdur Rahman’s relentless repression firmly sowed the seed of abiding hatred between Hazaras and Afghans for all times to come. Almost 35,000 families fled to Northern Afghanistan, Mashad and Quetta displacing almost 60 percent of the whole ethnic population. Short of the Partition, this should be the most horrific exodus of an entire people in the region’s history. The Hazaras had finally and decisively become unwelcome among Afghans, particularly Pushtuns on three counts. They came as conquerors and settled down on prime lands in Hazarajat. Much against the Sunni mass preference they converted to Shiism, thus, permanently creating a pro-Iran enclave dangerously close to the Pushtun seat of power in Kabul. Lastly, they kept their distinct identity and never assimilated. As a rule, history does not forget nor forgives collective mistakes made by the races or nations, which confront them eventually and draws retribution, often horrible.

The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan army and can be reached at clay.potter@hotmail.com

Daily Times 

Jafria Alliance urges Swat-like operation in Quetta

From the Newspaper | A Reporter



Shia including relatives of recent bomb blast victims, protest in Quetta. — Photo by AFP

ISLAMABAD: The Jafria Alliance has demanded of the government to launch a Swat-like operation in Quetta to save provincial capital from falling into the hands of extremists and terrorists.

Addressing a press conference here at the National Press Club, leader of Jafria Alliance Allama Abbas Kumaili said the police and administration in Balochistan were not only incompetent but also corrupt. “They have failed to execute their duties and are directly and indirectly protecting terrorists by not registering cases and presenting challans in courts.” Allama Kumaili said.

Had practical and effective steps been taken after the removal of Raisani-led government in January, the Hazara Town carnage would not have taken place after 35 days of another bombing, he said.

He narrated his own experience when he was a Senator in 2003 and had spoken against terror attacks in the province, “The-then Balochistan government registered a case against me and barred my entry into the province.”

He said sectarian groups have complete freedom to operate in the province’ He criticised the federal government for failing to ensure their directives were implemented.

“We have no trust and hope in political governments or even in governor Balochistan,” he said and added: “However there is a ray of hope in the suo motu taken by the apex court”.

The Jafria Alliance leader said that if directives of the Supreme Court to root out sectarianism and terrorism were not implemented, then there were chances that in future the outlaws would become more powerful than the Balochistan government.

DAWN

Hounded for being Hazara

ANITA JOSHUA

Isolated and massacred in sectarian violence, the Hazara Shias in Quetta are seeking a military takeover

It is no longer a question whether there will be another attack on the Hazara Shias of Quetta but when and where next. That is how certain everyone is of the terrorists’ agenda. In fact, of all the state and non-state actors who have said anything on the Hazara Shias in the week after their second massacre in 37 days, only the outlawed Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is expected to deliver. The LeJ threat is real and assurances of protection from various institutions of the State have time and again proved to be empty promises.

This sense of resignation is not without reason. For over a decade now, the Hazara Shias have been specifically targeted. While Shias in general are under attack, in the case of the Hazaras the task is made that much easier because of their distinctive Mongoloid features. But, their plight never got much attention. Why, even after the January 10 massacre in which over 80 Hazara Shias were killed in serial blasts, it became an issue only after the community took to the streets with the bodies in sub-zero temperature and refused to bury them.

A cursory look at media coverage is instructive. The massacre of 80-plus people in one locality in a day became a footnote rather quickly and the media was literally shamed into taking note of the Hazara Shia protests when civil society came out in support across the country. That was about a day into the protest of the Hazara Shias of Quetta.

Thus named and shamed into reacting, the response was a tad better when a similar massacre took place a month later in another Hazara settlement, killing nearly 90 members of the community yet again though locals insist the number is over a 100. Only their bodies remain untraceable as the impact was such that many were charred beyond recognition or blown to smithereens.

Still, it took another three-day protest with the bodies by the Hazara Shia community to get the government to order a targeted operation against the sectarian outfits. While it helped break the impasse and ensured that the bodies were buried, not many are convinced by the government’s claims of killing four terrorists and arresting 170 others in a day’s operation.

Factor of elections

With the spotlight turning on the tacit understanding between the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and many jihadi organisations, including the LeJ in its various incarnates, the Punjab government detained LeJ head Malik Ishaq under the Maintenance of Public Order a week after the second massacre of Hazara Shias. Police claim they acted on complaints regarding his provocative speeches over the past month. At best this is belated action because Ishaq, the alleged mastermind of the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore in 2009, has been delivering such speeches for months now and a random search on YouTube offers enough evidence. No one is convinced the detention will make much difference because during an earlier incarceration — before he was released in 2011 by the Supreme Court for lack of evidence — Ishaq had a cellphone in prison and was being paid a stipend by the Punjab government. And, the PML(N) can hardly be expected to go after the organisational network of these outfits on the eve of national and provincial elections given their vote bank that could make or break the party’s electoral prospects in as many as 40 constituencies.

So, with good reason, none of this “action” has brought any comfort to the Hazara Shia community, cowering in their “open air jails” — that’s what they call the two colonies of Quetta to which they have confined themselves to over the years. What they flag, instead, is the inability of the security establishment to act against sectarian outfits who openly address the media at the Quetta Press Club or the LeJ spokesman who routinely calls up journalists to claim responsibility and boast of capability to repeat their actions.

One such conversation happened soon after the February 16 blast with a LeJ spokesman claiming they had enough explosive material to conduct 20 more such blasts. In the last blast, 800 to 1,000 kilos of explosive material was packed into a tractor-trolley ferrying a water tanker which brought up the question as to how the vehicle managed to get through Quetta, one of the most barricaded cities of the country owing to Baloch insurgency.

Campaigns against them

There are other footprints too. According to Sajjad H. Changezi, a student member of Hazara for Humanity (HFH) spearheading the community’s campaign in Islamabad, the LeJ has launched an SMS service in some places of Quetta asking people to report to a certain mobile number as soon as they spot a Hazara.

Such campaigns against Hazara Shias have begun to impact their decision-making, particularly on issues like sending children to schools outside their so-called secured areas. That facade of security has also been stripped with the February 16 attack as the terrorists struck at Hazara Town; one of the two main Hazara Shia settlements of Quetta.

Criticism over suggestion

There has been a suggestion in the mainstream discourse that the Hazaras are being trained by Iran and the escalation of violence is a repeat of the 1980s Iran-Saudi Arabia tussle. Describing this charge as baseless, Mr. Changezi pointed out: “Iran has never acknowledged Hazara as a distinct ethnic identity. Despite living in Iran for decades, despite the common Shia faith, the three million Hazaras there have not been granted citizenship. Are the Hazaras killing Sunnis? Is there any proof of Hazara militancy?”

In their hour of grief, the Hazara Shias have drawn criticism for demanding a military takeover of Quetta because the security establishment is widely perceived to be the real reason for the situation not just in Balochistan but across the country. “It is a cry of despair,” said Fatima Atif, responding to a barrage of such questions in Islamabad with a toddler in her arms. “This is not an ideal option, but our last option. The police are clearly unable to deal with the situation.”

As the Hazaras see it, the civilian administration of Balochistan is toothless as the security establishment calls the shots in the restive province. By putting the Army in actual control, the hope is that they would be forced to prevent such attacks to keep their own slate clean. And, despite the Army’s rejection of allegations of the LeJ and company being its proxies, the widely held perception is that many of these Punjab-based jihadi organisations have been pushed into Balochistan to target the Baloch nationals and help change the demography of the resource-rich province.

If in the process, they further their own sectarian agenda, then turn a blind eye as Pakistan still reaps the bitter fruits of Zia’s Islamisation project that encouraged “Sunnification” of the country with Saudi money. It will create, in the words of author Irfan Husain, “a witch’s brew of violent forces” in which the Hazaras are just collateral damage.

The Hindu